Mo. Rev. Stat. ch. 1

Mo. Rev. Stat. ch. 1
in effect

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.010 Common law in force - effect on statutes - failure to render health care ...

1.010. Common law in force — effect on statutes — failure to render health care services, no common law cause of action. — 1. The common law of England and all statutes and acts of parliament made prior to the fourth year of the reign of James the First, of a general nature, which are not local to that kingdom and not repugnant to or inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, the constitution of this state, or the statute laws in force for the time being, are the rule of action and decision in this state, any custom or usage to the contrary notwithstanding, but no act of the general assembly or law of this state shall be held to be invalid, or limited in its scope or effect by the courts of this state, for the reason that it is in derogation of, or in conflict with, the common law, or with such statutes or acts of parliament; but all acts of the general assembly, or laws, shall be liberally construed, so as to effectuate the true intent and meaning thereof. 2. The general assembly expressly excludes from this section the common law of England as it relates to claims arising out of the rendering of or failure to render health care services by a health care provider, it being the intent of the general assembly to replace those claims with statutory causes of action. (RSMo 1939 § 645, A.L. 1957 p. 587, A.L. 2015 S.B. 239) Prior revisions: 1929 § 645; 1919 § 7048; 1909 § 8047 (1953) Fact that statute changed a rule of common law does not require that it be strictly construed. Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1224, 258 S.W.2d 577. (1977) Assuming doctrine of sovereign immunity was part of common law adopted by state of Missouri, supreme court has authority to alter or abrogate it and did so. Jones v. State Highway Commission (Mo.), 557 S.W.2d 225.

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.016 Secondary sources do not constitute law or public policy, when.

1.016. Secondary sources do not constitute law or public policy, when. — A secondary source, including a legal treatise, scholarly publication, textbook, or other explanatory text, does not constitute the law or public policy of this state to the extent its adoption would create, eliminate, expand, or restrict a cause of action, right, or remedy, or to the extent it is inconsistent with, or in conflict with, or otherwise not addressed by, Missouri statutory law or Missouri appellate case law precedent. (L. 2022 S.B. 775, et al.)

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.020 Definitions.

1.020. Definitions. — As used in the statutory laws of this state, unless otherwise specially provided or unless plainly repugnant to the intent of the legislature or to the context thereof: (1) "Certified mail" or "certified mail with return receipt requested" , includes certified mail carried by the United States Postal Service, or any parcel or letter carried by an overnight, express, or ground delivery service that allows a sender or recipient to electronically track its location and provides record of the signature of the recipient; (2) "County or circuit attorney" means prosecuting attorney; (3) "Executor" includes administrator where the subject matter applies to an administrator; (4) "General election" means the election required to be held on the Tuesday succeeding the first Monday of November, biennially; (5) "Guardian" , if used in a section in a context relating to property rights or obligations, means conservator of the estate as defined in chapter 475 . "Guardianship" , if used in a section in a context relating to rights and obligations other than property rights or obligations, means guardian of the person as defined in chapter 475 ; (6) "Handicap" means a mental or physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, whether the impairment is congenital or acquired by accident, injury, or disease, and where the impairment is verified by medical findings; (7) "Heretofore" means any time previous to the day when the statute containing it takes effect; and "hereafter" means the time after the statute containing it takes effect; (8) "In vacation" includes any adjournment of court for more than one day whenever any act is authorized to be done by or any power given to a court, or judge thereof in vacation, or whenever any act is authorized to be done by or any power given to a clerk of any court in vacation; (9) "Incompetent" , if used in a section in a context relating to actual occupational ability without reference to a court adjudication of incompetency, means the actual ability of a person to perform in that occupation. "Incompetent", if used in a section in a context relating to the property rights and obligations of a person, means a disabled person as defined in chapter 475 . "Incompetent", if used in a section in a context relating to the rights and obligations of a person other than property rights and obligations, means an incapacitated person as defined in chapter 475 ; (10) "Justice of the county court" means commissioner of the county commission; (11) "Month" and "year" . "Month" means a calendar month, and "year" means a calendar year unless otherwise expressed, and is equivalent to the words year of our Lord; (12) The word "person" may extend and be applied to bodies politic and corporate, and to partnerships and other unincorporated associations; (13) "Personal property" includes money, goods, chattels, things in action and evidences of debt; (14) "Place of residence" means the place where the family of any person permanently resides in this state, and the place where any person having no family generally lodges; (15) "Preceding" and "following" , when used by way of reference to any section of the statutes, mean the section next preceding or next following that in which the reference is made, unless some other section is expressly designated in the reference; (16) "Property" includes real and personal property; (17) "Real property" or "premises" or "real estate" or "lands" is coextensive with lands, tenements and hereditaments; (18) "State" , when applied to any of the United States, includes the District of Columbia and the territories, and the words "United States" includes such district and territories; (19) "Under legal disability" includes persons within the age of minority or of unsound mind or imprisoned; (20) "Ward" , if used in a section in a context relating to the property rights and obligations of a person, means a protectee as defined in chapter 475 . "Ward", if used in a section in a context relating to the rights and obligations of a person other than property rights and obligations, means a ward as defined in chapter 475 ; (21) "Will" includes the words testament and codicil; (22) "Written" and "in writing" and "writing word for word" includes printing, lithographing, or other mode of representing words and letters, but in all cases where the signature of any person is required, the proper handwriting of the person, or his mark, is intended. (RSMo 1939 §§ 649, 650, 653, 655, A. 1949 S.B. 1001, A.L. 1957 p. 587, A.L. 1978 H.B. 971, H.B. 1634, A.L. 1983 S.B. 44 & 45, A.L. 1988 S.B. 655, A.L. 2009 H.B. 652) Prior revisions: 1929 §§ 649, 650, 653, 655; 1919 §§ 7052, 7053, 7056, 7058; 1909 §§ 8051, 8052, 8055, 8057 CROSS REFERENCE: Criminal code definitions, 556.061 (1965) St. Louis alderman held not "resident" of ward from which he had been elected and thereby forfeited office, although he had been born and raised in ward, was registered to vote there, spent his working day there, had living accommodations in ward above drug store operated by brothers and sister, and received his business mail and business phone calls there. He maintained home outside ward where he kept family and spent evenings and Sundays. Actual place of residence controls. State v. Mueller (A.), 388 S.W.2d 53. (1971) Legislative body of which he is a member has exclusive right to determine elected representative's qualifications to hold or assume office and courts are without jurisdiction to determine issue of removal of residence from district. State v. Hickey (Mo.), 475 S.W.2d 617.

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.025 Registered mail defined.

1.025. Registered mail defined. — As used in the statute laws of this state, "registered mail" , when used with reference to the sending of notice or any article having no intrinsic value, includes certified mail as defined and certified under regulations of the United States Post Office Department . (L. 1958 2d Ex. Sess. p. 173 § 1)

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.028 English is the common language of Missouri.

1.028. English is the common language of Missouri. — The general assembly recognizes that English is the common language used in Missouri and recognizes that fluency in English is necessary for full integration into our common American culture for reading readiness. (L. 1998 S.B. 583 & 645 § 1, A.L. 1999 H.B. 889) CROSS REFERENCES: Access to English language services, resettling of refugees and immigrants, grants provided, 660.025 Adult basic education program, English language services provided to nonnative speakers, 161.227 Grants provided for instruction in the English language, when, 161.223 Wills and estates, translation to English, when, 474.382

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.030 Plural includes the singular - masculine includes feminine.

1.030. Plural includes the singular — masculine includes feminine. — 1. Whenever, in any statute, words importing the plural number are used in describing or referring to any matter, parties or persons, any single matter, party or person is included, although distributive words are not used. 2. When any subject matter, party or person is described or referred to by words importing the singular number or the masculine gender, several matters and persons, and females as well as males, and bodies corporate as well as individuals, are included. (RSMo 1939 §§ 651, 652, A.L. 1957 p. 587) Prior revisions: 1929 §§ 651, 652; 1919 §§ 7054, 7055; 1909 §§ 8053, 8054 (1992) Use of word "he" includes both male and female and because section 566.030, RSMo, encompasses the conduct of both males and females, there is no violation of the equal protection clauses of the United States or Missouri Constitutions. State v. Stokely, 842 S.W.2d 77 (Mo. en banc).

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.035 Voter defined.

1.035. Voter defined. — Whenever the word "voter" is used in the laws of this state it shall mean registered voter, or legal voter. (L. 1973 H.B. 20, et al. § 27)

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.037 International organizations or bodies, no jurisdiction or power within Missouri.

1.037. International organizations or bodies, no jurisdiction or power within Missouri. — 1. The World Health Organization, the United Nations, the World Economic Forum, and any other international organization or body shall have no jurisdiction or power within the state of Missouri. No rule, regulation, fee, tax, policy, or mandate of any kind of the World Health Organization, the United Nations, the World Economic Forum, or any other international organization or body shall be enforced or implemented by the state of Missouri or any agency, department, board, or commission of the state or any municipality or other political subdivision of the state. 2. The term "international organization or body" as used in this section shall not include the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH). Nothing in this section shall prohibit the child support program of the family support division within the department of social services from enforcing or implementing any provision of any convention, protocol, or instrument issued by the Hague Conference on Private International Law (HCCH). (L. 2026 S.B. 977 & 1011)

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.040 Computation of time.

1.040. Computation of time. — The time within which an act is to be done shall be computed by excluding the first day and including the last. If the last day is Sunday it shall be excluded. (RSMo 1939 § 655, A. 1949 S.B. 1001, A.L. 1957 p. 587) Prior revisions: 1929 § 655; 1919 § 7058; 1909 § 8057 CROSS REFERENCE: Civil code of procedure for cases at law, periods of time prescribed by the code, 506.060 (1956) Where ninetieth day for filing mechanic's lien occurred on Decoration Day, May 30, which was Sunday, the time for filing under § 506.060 was extended until Tuesday, June 1, because Monday became the holiday under § 9.010. Herman v. Dixon (A.), 285 S.W.2d 716. (1974) Computation of time clarified. Bowling v. Webb Gas Co., Inc. of Lebanon (Mo.), 505 S.W.2d 39. (1974) Option given on January 21 and providing for seventy-five days to act and further providing that notification by mail deposited on or before expiration date would be sufficient was complied with by notice mailed April 5. Gottlieb v. LaBrunerie (A.), 514 S.W.2d 27. (1986) This section is applicable to statutes only, not to city charter provisions. Friends of City Market v. Old Town Redevelopment, 714 S.W.2d 569 (Mo.App.).

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.050 Majority may act for all.

1.050. Majority may act for all. — Words importing joint authority to three or more persons shall be construed as authority to a majority of the persons, unless otherwise declared in the law giving the authority. (RSMo 1939 § 655, A. 1949 S.B. 1001, A.L. 1957 p. 587) Prior revisions: 1929 § 655; 1919 § 7058; 1909 § 8057

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.060 Powers of deputies.

1.060. Powers of deputies. — When a statute requires an act to be done, which by law an agent or deputy as well may do as the principal, the requisition is satisfied by the performance of the act by an authorized agent or deputy. (RSMo 1939 § 655, A. 1949 S.B. 1001, A.L. 1957 p. 587) Prior revisions: 1929 § 655; 1919 § 7058; 1909 § 8057

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.070 Reference to provisions in revised statutes.

1.070. Reference to provisions in revised statutes. — 1. "RSMo" may be used as an abbreviation for the "Revised Statutes of Missouri" and "RSMo Supp.", when followed by the number of the year, means the Supplement to the Revised Statutes of Missouri published by the state after final adjournment of the session of the general assembly held in that year. 2. Whenever in the statute laws of this state a reference is made to several sections and the section numbers given in the reference are connected by the word "to", the reference includes both sections whose numbers are given and all intervening sections. (1949 S.B. 1001 § 1.07, A.L. 1957 p. 587)

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.080 County to include St. Louis - county clerk to include register of St. Louis.

1.080. County to include St. Louis — county clerk to include register of St. Louis. — Whenever the word "county" is used in any law, general in its character to the whole state, it includes the city of St. Louis, unless such construction is inconsistent with the evident intent of the law, or of some law specially applicable to such city. Whenever the county clerk is authorized or required to perform an act by a law which applies to the city of St. Louis as well as to the counties of the state, the register of the city of St. Louis is authorized or required to perform the act insofar as it is to be performed in the city. (RSMo 1939 § 655, A. 1949 S.B. 1001, A.L. 1957 p. 587) Prior revisions: 1929 § 655; 1919 § 7058; 1909 § 8057 CROSS REFERENCE: County officers of St. Louis, duties required by law to include corresponding city officers, when, 105.260

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.090 Words and phrases, how construed.

1.090. Words and phrases, how construed. — Words and phrases shall be taken in their plain or ordinary and usual sense, but technical words and phrases having a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law shall be understood according to their technical import. (RSMo 1939 § 655, A. 1949 S.B. 1001, A.L. 1957 p. 587) Prior revisions: 1929 § 655; 1919 § 7058; 1909 § 8057 (1967) When used in statutes the word "shall" is generally regarded as imperative or mandatory and must be given a compulsory meaning. Stanfield v. Swenson (A.) 381 F.2d 755. (1991) If language of statute may be subject to more than one construction, the law favors the construction which is in harmony with reason and common sense and tends to avoid unreasonable and absurd results. Term "resident" means resident at time of commencement of appointed duties. Shands v. City of Kennett, 756 F.Supp. 420 (E.D. Mo.).

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.092 Best interest of child, welfare policy of state.

1.092. Best interest of child, welfare policy of state. — The child welfare policy of this state is what is in the best interests of the child. (L. 1995 H.B. 232 & 485 merged with S.B. 174)

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.100 Population, how determined - effective date of census - change in ...

1.100. Population, how determined — effective date of census — change in population, effect of. — 1. The population of any political subdivision of the state for the purpose of representation or other matters including the ascertainment of the salary of any county officer for any year or for the amount of fees he may retain or the amount he is allowed to pay for deputies and assistants is determined on the basis of the last previous decennial census of the United States. For the purposes of this section the effective date of the 1960 decennial census of the United States is July 1, 1961, and the effective date of each succeeding decennial census of the United States is July first of each tenth year after 1961; except that for the purposes of ascertaining the salary of any county officer for any year or for the amount of fees he may retain or the amount he is allowed to pay for deputies and assistants the effective date of the 1960 decennial census of the United States is January 1, 1961, and the effective date of each succeeding decennial census is January first of each tenth year after 1961. 2. Any law which is limited in its operation to counties, cities or other political subdivisions having a specified population or a specified assessed valuation shall be deemed to include all counties, cities or political subdivisions which thereafter acquire such population or assessed valuation as well as those in that category at the time the law passed. Once a city, county, or political subdivision has come under the operation of such a law a subsequent change in population shall not remove that city, county, or political subdivision from the operation of that law regardless of whether the city, county, or political subdivision comes under the operation of the law after the law was passed. No person whose compensation is set by a statutory formula, which is based in part on a population factor, shall have his compensation reduced due solely to an increase in the population factor. (RSMo 1939 §§ 654, 13430, A.L. 1945 p. 1550, A. 1949 S.B. 1001, A.L. 1957 p. 587, A.L. 1959 H.B. 304, A.L. 1971 H.B. 154, A.L. 2017 H.B. 451) Prior revisions: 1929 §§ 654, 11808; 1919 §§ 7057, 11016; 1909 §§ 856, 10719 (1975) Held that this section clearly prevented St. Louis City from coming under law applicable to cities of 300,000 to 700,000 population. State ex rel. McNeal v. Roach (Mo.), 520 S.W.2d 69. (1975) This section is applicable to population for the purpose of convening grand juries. State ex. rel. Woods v. Connett (Mo.), 525 S.W.2d 326. (1981) Legislation enacted to address the class of which the City of St. Louis is the only member is not special legislation within the meaning of Article III, Section 40 , of the Missouri Constitution. Boyd-Richardson Co. v. Leachman (Mo.), 615 S.W.2d 46.

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.120 Reenactments, how construed.

1.120. Reenactments, how construed. — The provisions of any law or statute which is reenacted, amended or revised, so far as they are the same as those of a prior law, shall be construed as a continuation of such law and not as a new enactment. (RSMo 1939 § 683, A. 1949 S.B. 1001, A.L. 1957 p. 587) Prior revisions: 1929 § 683; 1919 § 7087; 1909 § 8086

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.130 Effective date of laws.

1.130. Effective date of laws. — A law passed by the general assembly takes effect ninety days after the adjournment of the session at which it is enacted; but if the general assembly recesses for thirty days or more, it may prescribe by joint resolution that laws previously passed and not effective take effect ninety days from the beginning of the recess, subject to the following exceptions: (1) A law necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, which emergency is expressed in the body or preamble of the act and which is declared to be thus necessary by the general assembly, by a vote of two-thirds of its members elected to each house the vote to be taken by yeas and nays, and entered on the journal, or a law making an appropriation for the current expenses of the state government, for the maintenance of the state institutions or for the support of public schools, takes effect as of the hour and minute of its approval by the governor; which hour and minute may be endorsed by the governor on the bill at the time of its approval; (2) In case the general assembly, as to a law not of the character herein specified, provides that the law takes effect on a date in the future subsequent to the expiration of the period of ninety days herein mentioned the law takes effect on the date thus fixed by the general assembly; (3) In case the general assembly provides that any law takes effect as provided in subdivision (1) of this section, the general assembly may provide in such law that the operative date of the law or parts of the law takes effect on a date subsequent to the effective date of the law. (RSMo 1939 § 659, A.L. 1945 p. 1114, A.L. 1957 p. 587) Prior revisions: 1929 § 659; 1919 § 7067; 1909 § 8061 CROSS REFERENCE: Effective date of constitutional amendments, Const. Art. XII § 2(b) (1991) "Later in time" rule of statutory construction does not apply when sections are passed in the same legislative session and neither has an emergency clause. Berdella v. Pender, 821 S.W.2d 846 (Mo.banc).

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.140 Severability of statute provisions.

1.140. Severability of statute provisions. — The provisions of every statute are severable. If any provision of a statute is found by a court of competent jurisdiction to be unconstitutional, the remaining provisions of the statute are valid unless the court finds the valid provisions of the statute are so essentially and inseparably connected with, and so dependent upon, the void provision that it cannot be presumed the legislature would have enacted the valid provisions without the void one; or unless the court finds that the valid provisions, standing alone, are incomplete and are incapable of being executed in accordance with the legislative intent. (1949 S.B. 1001 § 1.14, A.L. 1957 p. 587) CROSS REFERENCE: Revisor may omit severability clauses from statutes, 3.030 (1951) If by striking out a void part of the statute, the remainder by reason of its generality will have a broader scope as to subject or territory and its operation would not be in accord with legislative intent, the whole could be made void by the invalidity of such part. Preisler v. Calcaterra, 362 Mo. 662, 243 S.W.2d 62. (1951) Sections 295.090, 295.180 and 295.200 are severable from the remainder of this law (§§ 295.010 to 295.210) so that the constitutionality of such sections need not be determined in mandamus proceedings to compel payment of compensation of members of state board of mediation. Remainder of law provides a complete, sensible and valid enactment consistent with the state and federal constitutions and federal labor legislation, and therefore capable of being carried into execution as intended by the legislature. State ex rel. State Board of Mediation, 362 Mo. 798, 244 S.W.2d 75. (1961) Where severance clause in use tax law stated that the legislature declared that if any exemption from taxation contained in the act was invalid under the constitution it intended to and thereby imposed the same tax on the exempted use as was imposed on the use of other property subject to the tax, held to prevent the act containing invalid exemptions from being wholly unconstitutional. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Morris (Mo.), 345 S.W.2d 52; Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. M.E. Morris (Mo.), 345 S.W.2d 62. (1966) The absence of a severability clause is of no significance in a determination of whether an entire statute must fall because of invalidity of a portion of the statute. St. Louis County v. City of Florissant (Mo.), 406 S.W.2d 281. (1998) License fee provision of ordinance regulating tobacco product sales, adopted without voter approval in violation of Hancock Amendment, was not so essentially and inseparably connected with other substantive provisions in ordinance that ordinance would not accomplish its purpose if license fee was eliminated, therefore the fee provision was severable, and savings clause indicated legislative intent to retain any provisions not violative of the constitution. Avanti Petroleum, Inc. v. St. Louis County, 974 S.W.2d 506 (Mo.App. E.D.)

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.160 Effect of repeal of penal statute.

1.160. Effect of repeal of penal statute. — No offense committed and no fine, penalty or forfeiture incurred, or prosecution commenced or pending previous to or at the time when any statutory provision is repealed or amended, shall be affected by the repeal or amendment, but the trial and punishment of all such offenses, and the recovery of the fines, penalties or forfeitures shall be had, in all respects, as if the provision had not been repealed or amended, except that all such proceedings shall be conducted according to existing procedural laws. (RSMo 1939 § 4861, A.L. 1957 p. 587, A.L. 1993 S.B. 180, A.L. 2005 H.B. 353) Prior revisions: 1929 § 4468; 1919 § 3709; 1909 § 4920 (1972) Where defendant was convicted of possession of narcotic drug and sentenced to three years imprisonment, his appeal argued and submitted on September 27, 1971, but prior to submission on August 31, 1971, appellant filed "Alternative Motion for Reduction of Sentence" based upon an amendment, effective September 28, 1971, of statute which reduced punishment for his offense to confinement in county jail for not more than one year or fine of $1,000, or both, supreme court remanded cause for assessment of punishment and judgment under the law as amended. State v. Reiley (Mo.), 476 S.W.2d 473. (1972) Where appellant's conviction and sentence for possession of marijuana occurred at a time when the first conviction for that offense was a felony regardless of amount of marijuana involved and while appeal was pending an amendment to the law to make possession of thirty-five grams or less a misdemeanor became effective, the cause was remanded for assessment of punishment under the law as amended. State v. Hawkins (Mo.), 482 S.W.2d 477. (1974) Held that when license was reinstated prior to effective date of amendatory act providing for elimination of points on reinstatement the act could not be applied retroactively. Ritter v. Schaffner (A.), 504 S.W.2d 207. (1990) Where statute specifying punishment in effect at time of defendant's arrest was subsequently repealed and new statute, providing for lesser punishment, became effective few days prior to trial, defendant was entitled to benefit of reduced punishment. State v. Wright, 797 S.W.2d 811 (Mo. App.). (2018) For purposes of this section, a parole eligibility provision within a statute defining an offense affects the prosecution, penalty, or punishment of offense, thus amended version of involuntary manslaughter statute was not retroactively applicable to parole eligibility for prisoner. Fields v. Missouri Bd. of Probation and Parole, 559 S.W.3d 12 (W.D.Mo.).

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.170 Repeal of law not to affect rights acquired thereunder.

1.170. Repeal of law not to affect rights acquired thereunder. — The repeal of any statutory provision does not affect any act done or right accrued or established in any proceeding, suit or prosecution had or commenced in any civil case previous to the time when the repeal takes effect; but every such act, right and proceeding remains as valid and effectual as if the provisions so repealed had remained in force. (RSMo 1939 § 660, A.L. 1957 p. 587) Prior revisions: 1929 § 660; 1919 § 7063; 1909 § 8062

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.180 Actions pending, how affected by repeal of law.

1.180. Actions pending, how affected by repeal of law. — No action or plea pending at the time any statutory provisions are repealed shall be affected by the repeal; but the same shall proceed, in all respects, as if the statutory provisions had not been repealed, except that all proceedings had after the repeal becomes effective are governed by procedural rules and laws then in effect, insofar as they are applicable. (RSMo 1939 § 662, A.L. 1957 p. 587) Prior revisions: 1929 § 662; 1919 § 7065; 1909 § 8064

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.185 Civil court actions, public officials prohibited from compromising or ...

1.185. Civil court actions, public officials prohibited from compromising or settling if conflict with chapters 115 to 128 — challenge to constitutionality of statute, procedure — intervention in cases, when. — 1. As used in this section, the term "public official" means any elected or appointed officer, employee, or agent of the state or any political subdivision, board, commission, bureau, or other public body established by law. 2. In any civil action in a state or federal court, no public official, including any attorney representing or acting on behalf of a public official, has any authority to compromise or settle an action, consent to any condition, or agree to any order in connection therewith if the compromise, settlement, condition, or order nullifies, suspends, enjoins, alters, or conflicts with any provision of chapters 115 to 128 . 3. Any compromise, settlement, condition, or order to which a public official agrees that conflicts with subsection 2 of this section is void and has no legal effect. 4. Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or otherwise restrict any powers granted by Article * III or VIII of the Constitution of Missouri. 5. When a party to an action in state or federal court challenges the constitutionality of a statute facially or as applied, challenges a statute as violating or preempted by federal law, or otherwise challenges the construction or validity of a statute, as part of a claim or affirmative defense, that party shall provide a copy of the pleading to the speaker of the house of representatives and the president pro tempore of the senate within fourteen days of filing the pleading with the court. The speaker of the house of representatives and the president pro tempore of the senate may intervene to defend against the action at any time in the action as a matter of right by serving motion upon the parties as provided by applicable rules of civil procedure. 6. The speaker of the house of representatives may intervene at any time in an action on behalf of the house of representatives. The speaker may obtain legal counsel other than from the attorney general, with the cost of representation paid from funds appropriated for that purpose, to represent the house of representatives in any action in which the speaker intervenes. 7. The president pro tempore of the senate may intervene at any time in an action on behalf of the senate. The president pro tempore may obtain legal counsel other than from the attorney general, with the cost of representation paid from funds appropriated for that purpose, to represent the senate in any action in which the president pro tempore intervenes. 8. The president pro tempore of the senate and the speaker of the house of representatives, acting jointly, may intervene at any time in an action on behalf of the general assembly. The president pro tempore and the speaker, acting jointly, may obtain legal counsel other than from the attorney general, with the cost of representation paid from funds appropriated for that purpose, to represent the general assembly in any action in which the president pro tempore and speaker jointly intervene. 9. No individual member, or group of members, of the senate or of the house of representatives, except the president pro tempore and the speaker as provided under this section, shall intervene in an action described in this section or obtain legal counsel at public expense under this section in the member's or group's capacity as a member or members of the senate or the house of representatives. 10. Notwithstanding any contrary provision of law, the participation of the speaker of the house of representatives or the president pro tempore of the senate in any state or federal action, as a party or otherwise, does not constitute a waiver of the legislative immunity or legislative privilege of any member, officer, or staff of the general assembly. (L. 2022 H.B. 1878 § 2) *Word "articles" appears in original rolls.

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.190 Notices, how served.

1.190. Notices, how served. — Whenever any of the statutes of this state require or imply that a notice shall be given to any person concerning or affecting any right, property, claim, duty, matter or thing of any character or nature, unless the statutes expressly direct a different method of service, the delivery of a true copy of the notice to the person intended to be notified, or the leaving of a copy at his usual place of abode with some member of his family over the age of fifteen years, constitutes a valid and sufficient service of the notice. (RSMo 1939 § 1437, A.L. 1957 p. 587) Prior revisions: 1929 § 1273; 1919 § 9156; 1909 § 10185 CROSS REFERENCES: Notice of taking depositions, how served, 492.180 Service of papers under civil code, 506.100

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.200 Equality of citizens.

1.200. Equality of citizens. — In all cases proper for the cognizance of the civil authority of this state and the courts of judicature in the same, all the citizens of the United States are equally entitled to the privileges of law and justice with the citizens of this state. (RSMo 1939 § 647, A.L. 1957 p. 587) Prior revisions: 1929 § 647; 1919 § 7050; 1909 § 8049

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.205 Life begins at conception - unborn child, defined - failure to provide ...

1.205. Life begins at conception — unborn child, defined — failure to provide prenatal care, no cause of action for. — 1. The general assembly of this state finds that: (1) The life of each human being begins at conception; (2) Unborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-being; (3) The natural parents of unborn children have protectable interests in the life, health, and well-being of their unborn child. 2. Effective January 1, 1988, the laws of this state shall be interpreted and construed to acknowledge on behalf of the unborn child at every stage of development, all the rights, privileges, and immunities available to other persons, citizens, and residents of this state, subject only to the Constitution of the United States, and decisional interpretations thereof by the United States Supreme Court and specific provisions to the contrary in the statutes and constitution of this state. 3. As used in this section, the term "unborn children" or "unborn child" shall include all unborn child or children or the offspring of human beings from the moment of conception until birth at every stage of biological development. 4. Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as creating a cause of action against a woman for indirectly harming her unborn child by failing to properly care for herself or by failing to follow any particular program of prenatal care. (L. 1986 H.B. 1596) CROSS REFERENCE: Abortion regulations, Chap. 188 (1989) Where section by its terms does not regulate abortions or any other aspect of appellees' medical practice, it can be read simply to express a value judgment. The extent to which the statute might be used to interpret other state statutes or regulations is something that only the courts of Missouri can definitely decide. U. S. Supreme Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of the section unless the meaning of the section is applied to restrict the activities of a claimant in some concrete way. Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 109 S.Ct. 3040. (1992) Definition of "person" in this section, which includes unborn children is applicable to other statutes and court concludes that it applies at least to the involuntary manslaughter statute, section 565.024, RSMo. State v. Knapp, 843 S.W.2d 345 (Mo. en banc). (1995) Statute sets out a canon of interpretation enacted by general assembly directing that time of conception and not viability is the determinative point at which legally protectable rights, privileges and immunities of an unborn child should be deemed to begin. Statute further sets out the intention of the general assembly that courts should read all Missouri statutes in pari materia with this section. Connor v. Monkem Co., Inc., 898 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. en banc).

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.210 No imprisonment without authority of law.

1.210. No imprisonment without authority of law. — No person's body shall be imprisoned or restrained unless by authority of law. (RSMo 1939 § 648, A.L. 1957 p. 587) Prior revisions: 1929 § 648; 1919 § 7051; 1909 § 8050

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.217 Cloning - use of state funds prohibited, definition.

1.217. Cloning — use of state funds prohibited, definition. — No state funds shall be used for research with respect to the cloning of a human person. For purposes of this section, the term "cloning" means the replication of a human person by taking a cell with genetic material and cultivating such cell through the egg, embryo, fetal and newborn stages of development into a new human person. (L. 1998 S.B. 722 § 17)

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.302 Religious freedom restoration act.

1.302. Religious freedom restoration act. — 1. A governmental authority may not restrict a person's free exercise of religion, unless: (1) The restriction is in the form of a rule of general applicability, and does not discriminate against religion, or among religions; and (2) The governmental authority demonstrates that application of the restriction to the person is essential to further a compelling governmental interest, and is not unduly restrictive considering the relevant circumstances. 2. As used in this section, "exercise of religion" shall be defined as an act or refusal to act that is substantially motivated by religious belief, whether or not the religious exercise is compulsory or central to a larger system of religious belief. 3. As used in this section "demonstrates" means meets the burden of going forward with the evidence and of persuasion. (L. 2003 S.B. 12) (2018) As applied to plaintiffs, city ordinance prohibiting discrimination based on person's reproductive health decisions or pregnancy violated section and the First Amendment's right to expressive association, and the city failed to show that ordinance furthered a compelling government interest or was not unduly restrictive. Our Lady's Inn v. City of St. Louis, 349 F.Supp.3d 805 (E.D.Mo.).

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.307 Applicability of religious freedom restoration act - limitations - relevant ...

1.307. Applicability of religious freedom restoration act — limitations — relevant circumstances defined. — 1. Section 1.302 and this section apply to all state and local laws, resolutions and ordinances and the implementation of such laws, resolutions, and ordinances, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after August 28, 2003. 2. Nothing in section 1.302 and this section shall be construed to authorize any government to burden any religious belief, except that nothing in these sections shall be construed to establish or eliminate a defense to a civil action or criminal prosecution based on a federal, state, or local civil rights law. 3. Nothing in section 1.302 and this section shall be construed as allowing any person to cause physical injury to another person, to possess a weapon otherwise prohibited by law, to fail to provide monetary support for a child or to fail to provide health care for a child suffering from a life-threatening condition. 4. "Relevant circumstances" may include legitimate penological interests needed to protect the safety and security of incarcerated persons and correctional facilities, but shall not include reasonable requests by incarcerated individuals for the opportunity to pray, reasonable access to clergy, use of religious materials that are not violent or profane, and reasonable dietary requests. (L. 2003 S.B. 12) (2018) As applied to plaintiffs, city ordinance prohibiting discrimination based on person's reproductive health decisions or pregnancy violated section and the First Amendment's right to expressive association, and the city failed to show that ordinance furthered a compelling government interest or was not unduly restrictive. Our Lady's Inn v. City of St. Louis, 349 F.Supp.3d 805 (E.D.Mo.).

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.310 Big government get off my back act - certain federal mandates not subject ...

1.310. Big government get off my back act — certain federal mandates not subject to appropriations or statutory authorization — 1. This section shall be known and may be cited as the "Big Government Get Off My Back Act". 2. Any federal mandate compelling the state to enact, enforce, or administer a federal regulatory program shall be subject to authorization through appropriation or statutory enactment. 3. No user fees imposed by the state of Missouri shall increase for the five-year period beginning on August 28, 2009, unless such fee increase is to implement a federal program administered by the state or is a result of an act of the general assembly. For purposes of this section, "user fee" does not include employer taxes or contributions, assessments to offset the cost of examining insurance or financial institutions, any health-related taxes approved by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services, or any professional or occupational licensing fees set by a board of members of that profession or occupation and required by statute to be set at a level not to exceed the cost of administration. 4. For the five-year period beginning on August 28, 2009, any state agency proposing a rule as that term is defined in subdivision (6) of section 536.010 , other than any rule promulgated as a result of a federal mandate, or to implement a federal program administered by the state or an act of the general assembly, shall either: (1) Certify that the rule does not have an adverse impact on small businesses consisting of fewer than fifty full- or part-time employees; or (2) Certify that the rule is necessary to protect the life, health or safety of the public; or (3) Exempt any small business consisting of fewer than fifty full- or part-time employees from coverage. 5. The provisions of this section shall not be construed to prevent or otherwise restrict an agency from promulgating emergency rules pursuant to section 536.025 , or from rescinding any existing rule pursuant to section 536.021 . (L. 2009 H.B. 191 § 1, A.L. 2011 H.B. 45)

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.330 Health care, no requirement to participate, no penalties - purchase or sale ...

1.330. Health care, no requirement to participate, no penalties — purchase or sale of health insurance in private system not prohibited — definitions. — 1. No law or rule shall compel, directly or indirectly, any person, employer, or health care provider to participate in any health care system. 2. A person or employer may pay directly for lawful health care services and shall not be required by law or rule to pay penalties or fines for paying directly for lawful health care services. A health care provider may accept direct payment for lawful health care services and shall not be required by law or rule to pay penalties or fines for accepting direct payment from a person or employer for lawful health care services. 3. Subject to reasonable and necessary rules that do not substantially limit a person's options, the purchase or sale of health insurance in private health care systems shall not be prohibited by law or rule. 4. This section does not: (1) Affect which health care services a health care provider or hospital is required to perform or provide; (2) Affect which health care services are permitted by law; (3) Prohibit care provided under workers' compensation as provided under state law; (4) Affect laws or regulations in effect as of January 1, 2010; (5) Affect the terms or conditions of any health care system to the extent that those terms and conditions do not have the effect of punishing a person or employer for paying directly for lawful health care services or a health care provider or hospital for accepting direct payment from a person or employer for lawful health care services. 5. As used in this section, the following terms shall mean: (1) "Compel" , any penalties or fines; (2) "Direct payment or pay directly" , payment for lawful health care services without a public or private third party, not including an employer, paying for any portion of the service; (3) "Health care system" , any public or private entity whose function or purpose is the management of, processing of, enrollment of individuals for or payment for, in full or in part, health care services or health care data or health care information for its participants; (4) "Lawful health care services" , any health-related service or treatment to the extent that the service or treatment is permitted or not prohibited by law or regulation that may be provided by persons or businesses otherwise permitted to offer such services; and (5) "Penalties or fines" , any civil or criminal penalty or fine, tax, salary or wage withholding or surcharge or any named fee with a similar effect established by law or rule by a government-established, -created or -controlled agency that is used to punish or discourage the exercise of rights protected under this section. (L. 2010 H.B. 1764 Adopted by referendum, Proposition C, August 3, 2010)

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.410 Citation of law - findings.

1.410. Citation of law — findings. — 1. Sections 1.410 to 1.485 shall be known and may be cited as the "Second Amendment Preservation Act". 2. The general assembly finds and declares that: (1) The general assembly of the state of Missouri is firmly resolved to support and defend the Constitution of the United States against every aggression, whether foreign or domestic, and is duty-bound to oppose every infraction of those principles that constitute the basis of the union of the states because only a faithful observance of those principles can secure the union's existence and the public happiness; (2) Acting through the Constitution of the United States, the people of the several states created the federal government to be their agent in the exercise of a few defined powers, while reserving for the state governments the power to legislate on matters concerning the lives, liberties, and properties of citizens in the ordinary course of affairs; (3) The limitation of the federal government's power is affirmed under Amendment X of the Constitution of the United States, which defines the total scope of federal powers as being those that have been delegated by the people of the several states to the federal government and all powers not delegated to the federal government in the Constitution of the United States are reserved to the states respectively or the people themselves; (4) If the federal government assumes powers that the people did not grant it in the Constitution of the United States, its acts are unauthoritative, void, and of no force; (5) The several states of the United States respect the proper role of the federal government but reject the proposition that such respect requires unlimited submission. If the federal government, created by a compact among the states, were the exclusive or final judge of the extent of the powers granted to it by the states through the Constitution of the United States, the federal government's discretion, and not the Constitution of the United States, would necessarily become the measure of those powers. To the contrary, as in all other cases of compacts among powers having no common judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself as to whether infractions of the compact have occurred, as well as to determine the mode and measure of redress. Although the several states have granted supremacy to laws and treaties made under the powers granted in the Constitution of the United States, such supremacy does not extend to various federal statutes, executive orders, administrative orders, court orders, rules, regulations, or other actions that collect data or restrict or prohibit the manufacture, ownership, or use of firearms, firearm accessories, or ammunition exclusively within the borders of Missouri; such statutes, executive orders, administrative orders, court orders, rules, regulations, and other actions exceed the powers granted to the federal government except to the extent they are necessary and proper for governing and regulating the United States Armed Forces or for organizing, arming, and disciplining militia forces actively employed in the service of the United States Armed Forces; (6) The people of the several states have given Congress the power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states", but "regulating commerce" does not include the power to limit citizens' right to keep and bear arms in defense of their families, neighbors, persons, or property nor to dictate what sorts of arms and accessories law-abiding Missourians may buy, sell, exchange, or otherwise possess within the borders of this state; (7) The people of the several states have also granted Congress the powers "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imports, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States" and "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the powers vested by the Constitution of the United States in the government of the United States, or in any department or office thereof". These constitutional provisions merely identify the means by which the federal government may execute its limited powers and shall not be construed to grant unlimited power because to do so would be to destroy the carefully constructed equilibrium between the federal and state governments. Consequently, the general assembly rejects any claim that the taxing and spending powers of Congress may be used to diminish in any way the right of the people to keep and bear arms; (8) The general assembly finds that the federal excise tax rate on arms and ammunition in effect prior to January 1, 2021, which funds programs under the Wildlife Restoration Act, does not have a chilling effect on the purchase or ownership of such arms and ammunition; (9) The people of Missouri have vested the general assembly with the authority to regulate the manufacture, possession, exchange, and use of firearms within the borders of this state, subject only to the limits imposed by Amendment II of the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of Missouri; and (10) The general assembly of the state of Missouri strongly promotes responsible gun ownership, including parental supervision of minors in the proper use, storage, and ownership of all firearms; the prompt reporting of stolen firearms; and the proper enforcement of all state gun laws. The general assembly of the state of Missouri hereby condemns any unlawful transfer of firearms and the use of any firearm in any criminal or unlawful activity. (L. 2021 H.B. 85 & 310) Effective 6-12-21 (2023) The Second Amendment Preservation Act is unconstitutional in its entirety as a violation of the Supremacy Clause, Article VI of the United States Constitution. United States v. Missouri, 660 F.Supp.3d 791 (W.D. Mo.).

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.420 Federal laws deemed infringements of United State and Missouri Constitutions.

1.420. Federal laws deemed infringements of United State and Missouri Constitutions. — The following federal acts, laws, executive orders, administrative orders, rules, and regulations shall be considered infringements on the people's right to keep and bear arms, as guaranteed by Amendment II of the Constitution of the United States and Article I, Section 23 of the Constitution of Missouri, within the borders of this state including, but not limited to: (1) Any tax, levy, fee, or stamp imposed on firearms, firearm accessories, or ammunition not common to all other goods and services and that might reasonably be expected to create a chilling effect on the purchase or ownership of those items by law-abiding citizens; (2) Any registration or tracking of firearms, firearm accessories, or ammunition; (3) Any registration or tracking of the ownership of firearms, firearm accessories, or ammunition; (4) Any act forbidding the possession, ownership, use, or transfer of a firearm, firearm accessory, or ammunition by law-abiding citizens; and (5) Any act ordering the confiscation of firearms, firearm accessories, or ammunition from law-abiding citizens. (L. 2021 H.B. 85 & 310) Effective 6-12-21 (2023) The Second Amendment Preservation Act is unconstitutional in its entirety as a violation of the Supremacy Clause, Article VI of the United States Constitution. United States v. Missouri, 660 F.Supp.3d 791 (W.D. Mo.).

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.430 Invalidity of federal laws deemed an infringement.

1.430. Invalidity of federal laws deemed an infringement. — All federal acts, laws, executive orders, administrative orders, rules, and regulations, regardless of whether they were enacted before or after the provisions of sections 1.410 to 1.485 , that infringe on the people's right to keep and bear arms as guaranteed by the Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article I, Section 23 of the Constitution of Missouri shall be invalid to this state, shall not be recognized by this state, shall be specifically rejected by this state, and shall not be enforced by this state. (L. 2021 H.B. 85 & 310) Effective 6-12-21 (2023) The Second Amendment Preservation Act is unconstitutional in its entirety as a violation of the Supremacy Clause, Article VI of the United States Constitution. United States v. Missouri, 660 F.Supp.3d 791 (W.D. Mo.)

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.440 Protection of citizens against infringement against right to keep and bear arms.

1.440. Protection of citizens against infringement against right to keep and bear arms. — It shall be the duty of the courts and law enforcement agencies of this state to protect the rights of law-abiding citizens to keep and bear arms within the borders of this state and to protect these rights from the infringements defined under section 1.420 . (L. 2021 H.B. 85 & 310) Effective 6-12-21 (2023) The Second Amendment Preservation Act is unconstitutional in its entirety as a violation of the Supremacy Clause, Article VI of the United States Constitution. United States v. Missouri, 660 F.Supp.3d 791 (W.D. Mo.).

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.450 Enforcement of federal laws that infringe on right to keep and bear arms ...

1.450. Enforcement of federal laws that infringe on right to keep and bear arms prohibited. — No entity or person, including any public officer or employee of this state or any political subdivision of this state, shall have the authority to enforce or attempt to enforce any federal acts, laws, executive orders, administrative orders, rules, regulations, statutes, or ordinances infringing on the right to keep and bear arms as described under section 1.420 . Nothing in sections 1.410 to 1.480 shall be construed to prohibit Missouri officials from accepting aid from federal officials in an effort to enforce Missouri laws. (L. 2021 H.B. 85 & 310) Effective 6-12-21 (2023) The Second Amendment Preservation Act is unconstitutional in its entirety as a violation of the Supremacy Clause, Article VI of the United States Constitution. United States v. Missouri, 660 F.Supp.3d 791 (W.D. Mo.).

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.460 Violations, liability and civil penalty - sovereign immunity not a defense.

1.460. Violations, liability and civil penalty — sovereign immunity not a defense. — 1. Any political subdivision or law enforcement agency that employs a law enforcement officer who acts knowingly, as defined under section 562.016 , to violate the provisions of section 1.450 or otherwise knowingly deprives a citizen of Missouri of the rights or privileges ensured by Amendment II of the Constitution of the United States or Article I, Section 23 of the Constitution of Missouri while acting under the color of any state or federal law shall be liable to the injured party in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, and subject to a civil penalty of fifty thousand dollars per occurrence. Any person injured under this section shall have standing to pursue an action for injunctive relief in the circuit court of the county in which the action allegedly occurred or in the circuit court of Cole County with respect to the actions of such individual. The court shall hold a hearing on the motion for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction within thirty days of service of the petition. 2. In such actions, the court may award the prevailing party, other than the state of Missouri or any political subdivision of the state, reasonable attorney's fees and costs. 3. Sovereign immunity shall not be an affirmative defense in any action pursuant to this section. (L. 2021 H.B. 85 & 310) Effective 6-12-21 (2023) The Second Amendment Preservation Act is unconstitutional in its entirety as a violation of the Supremacy Clause, Article VI of the United States Constitution. United States v. Missouri, 660 F.Supp.3d 791 (W.D. Mo.).

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.470 Employment of certain former federal employees prohibited, civil penalty - ...

1.470. Employment of certain former federal employees prohibited, civil penalty — standing — no sovereign immunity. — 1. Any political subdivision or law enforcement agency that knowingly employs an individual acting or who previously acted as an official, agent, employee, or deputy of the government of the United States, or otherwise acted under the color of federal law within the borders of this state, who has knowingly, as defined under section 562.016 , after the adoption of this section: (1) Enforced or attempted to enforce any of the infringements identified in section 1.420 ; or (2) Given material aid and support to the efforts of another who enforces or attempts to enforce any of the infringements identified in section 1.420 ; shall be subject to a civil penalty of fifty thousand dollars per employee hired by the political subdivision or law enforcement agency. Any person residing in a jurisdiction who believes that an individual has taken action that would violate the provisions of this section shall have standing to pursue an action. 2. Any person residing or conducting business in a jurisdiction who believes that an individual has taken action that would violate the provisions of this section shall have standing to pursue an action for injunctive relief in the circuit court of the county in which the action allegedly occurred or in the circuit court of Cole County with respect to the actions of such individual. The court shall hold a hearing on the motion for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction within thirty days of service of the petition. 3. In such actions, the court may award the prevailing party, other than the state of Missouri or any political subdivision of the state, reasonable attorney's fees and costs. 4. Sovereign immunity shall not be an affirmative defense in any action pursuant to this section. (L. 2021 H.B. 85 & 310) Effective 6-12-21 (2023) The Second Amendment Preservation Act is unconstitutional in its entirety as a violation of the Supremacy Clause, Article VI of the United States Constitution. United States v. Missouri, 660 F.Supp.3d 791 (W.D. Mo.).

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.480 Definitions - acts not deemed violation.

1.480. Definitions — acts not deemed violation. — 1. For sections 1.410 to 1.485 , the term "law-abiding citizen" shall mean a person who is not otherwise precluded under state law from possessing a firearm and shall not be construed to include anyone who is not legally present in the United States or the state of Missouri. 2. For the purposes of sections 1.410 to 1.480 , "material aid and support" shall include voluntarily giving or allowing others to make use of lodging; communications equipment or services, including social media accounts; facilities; weapons; personnel; transportation; clothing; or other physical assets. Material aid and support shall not include giving or allowing the use of medicine or other materials necessary to treat physical injuries, nor shall the term include any assistance provided to help persons escape a serious, present risk of life-threatening injury. 3. It shall not be considered a violation of sections 1.410 to 1.480 to provide material aid to federal officials who are in pursuit of a suspect when there is a demonstrable criminal nexus with another state or country and such suspect is either not a citizen of this state or is not present in this state. 4. It shall not be considered a violation of sections 1.410 to 1.480 to provide material aid to federal prosecution for: (1) Felony crimes against a person when such prosecution includes weapons violations substantially similar to those found in chapter 570 or * 571 so long as such weapons violations are merely ancillary to such prosecution; or (2) Class A or class B felony violations substantially similar to those found in chapter 579 when such prosecution includes weapons violations substantially similar to those found in chapter 570 or * 571 so long as such weapons violations are merely ancillary to such prosecution. 5. The provisions of sections 1.410 to 1.485 shall be applicable to offenses occurring on or after August 28, 2021. (L. 2021 H.B. 85 & 310) Effective 6-12-21 *Word "chapter" appears here in original rolls. (2023) The Second Amendment Preservation Act is unconstitutional in its entirety as a violation of the Supremacy Clause, Article VI of the United States Constitution. United States v. Missouri, 660 F.Supp.3d 791 (W.D. Mo.).

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.485 Severability clause.

1.485. Severability clause. — If any provision of sections 1.410 to 1.485 or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, such determination shall not affect the provisions or applications of sections 1.410 to 1.485 that may be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and the provisions of sections 1.410 to 1.485 are severable. (L. 2021 H.B. 85 & 310) Effective 6-12-21 (2023) The Second Amendment Preservation Act is unconstitutional in its entirety as a violation of the Supremacy Clause, Article VI of the United States Constitution. United States v. Missouri, 660 F.Supp.3d 791 (W.D. Mo.).

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.513 Broadband deployment, federal funds - failure to deploy, disclosure.

1.513. Broadband deployment, federal funds — failure to deploy, disclosure. — 1. The state of Missouri is hereby authorized to seek the deposit of federal funds designated for broadband deployment in Missouri from broadband providers who default or otherwise fail to complete deployment as agreed upon with the federal government. Such federal funds shall be deposited into a fund that is under the supervision of the Missouri office of broadband development. 2. Any provider in Missouri who defaults or otherwise fails to deploy broadband after receiving federal funds or any moneys from any other state for broadband services shall disclose such default or failure to deploy broadband services on any application to receive any state moneys in Missouri within seven days of such notice of default or failure to deploy broadband services. Any provider who has defaulted in this state or any other state shall be presumed incapable of fulfilling the provider's obligations to deploy broadband internet in Missouri. Such presumption shall be rebuttable. 3. The Missouri office of broadband development is hereby authorized to adjudicate any such findings under subsection 2 of this section in a manner consistent with Missouri law. (L. 2022 S.B. 820)

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.901 Delayed effective date for certain sections in H.B. 2637 & 3155, 2026.

1.901. Delayed effective date for certain sections in H.B. 2637 & 3155, 2026. — The repeal and reenactment of sections 217.362, 217.690 , 217.760 , 557.011 , 557.021 , 558.011 , 558.019 , 558.026 , 558.031 , 558.046 , 559.115 , 566.030 , 566.060 , 566.125 , 566.210 , 566.211 , 568.060 , and 589.425 of this act * shall become effective on January 1, 2028. (L. 2026 H.B. 2637 & 3155 § B) * "This act" (H.B. 2637 & 3155, 2026) contained numerous sections. Consult Disposition of Sections table for a definitive listing.

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.1001 Severability clause for H.B. 495, 2025.

1.1001. Severability clause for H.B. 495, 2025. — In the event that any section, provision, clause, phrase, or word of this act * or the application thereof is declared invalid under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of Missouri, it is the intent of the general assembly that the remaining sections of this act * remain in force and effect as far as they are capable of being carried into execution as intended by the general assembly. The general assembly hereby declares that it would have passed each section, provision, clause, phrase, or word thereof, irrespective of the fact that any one or more sections, provisions, clauses, phrases, or words of this act * or the application of this act * would be declared unenforceable, unconstitutional, or invalid. (L. 2025 H.B. 495 § 1) * "This act" contained numerous sections. Consult Disposition of Sections table for a definitive listing.

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.1002 Severability clause for H.B. 1696, 2026.

1.1002. Severability clause for H.B. 1696, 2026. — In the event that any section, provision, clause, phrase, or word of this act * or the application thereof is declared invalid under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of Missouri, whether on procedural or substantive grounds, it is the intent of the general assembly that the remaining sections of this act * remain in force and effect as far as they are capable of being carried into execution as intended by the general assembly. The general assembly hereby declares that it would have passed each section, provision, clause, phrase, or word thereof, irrespective of the fact that any one or more sections, provisions, clauses, phrases, or words of this act * or the application of this act * would be declared unenforceable, unconstitutional, or invalid. (L. 2026 H.B. 1696 § B) * "This act" (H.B. 1696, 2026) contained several sections. Consult Disposition of Sections table for a definitive listing.

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.1003 Severability clause for H.B. 1871, 2026.

1.1003. Severability clause for H.B. 1871, 2026. — In the event that any section, provision, clause, phrase, or word of this act * or the application thereof is declared invalid under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of Missouri, whether on procedural or substantive grounds, it is the intent of the general assembly that the remaining sections of this act * remain in force and effect as far as they are capable of being carried into execution as intended by the general assembly. The general assembly hereby declares that it would have passed each section, provision, clause, phrase, or word thereof, irrespective of the fact that any one or more sections, provisions, clauses, phrases, or words of this act * or the application of this act * would be declared unenforceable, unconstitutional, or invalid. (L. 2026 H.B. 1871 § B) * "This act" (H.B. 1871, 2026) contained numerous sections. Consult Dispositions of Sections table for a definitive listing.

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.1004 Severability clause for H.B. 2636, 2026.

1.1004. Severability clause for H.B. 2636, 2026. — If any provision of this act * or the application thereof to anyone or to any circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of those sections and the application of such provisions to others or other circumstances shall not be affected thereby. (L. 2026 H.B. 2636 § B) * "This act" (H.B. 2636, 2026) contained numerous sections. Consult Disposition of Sections table for a definitive listing.

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.1005 Severability clause for H.B. 2637 & 3155, 2026.

1.1005. Severability clause for H.B. 2637 & 3155, 2026. — In the event that any section, provision, clause, phrase, or word of this act * or the application thereof is declared invalid under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Missouri, whether on procedural or substantive grounds, it is the intent of the general assembly that the remaining sections of this act * remain in force and effect as far as they are capable of being carried into execution as intended by the general assembly. The general assembly hereby declares that it would have passed each section, provision, clause, phrase, or word thereof, irrespective of the fact that any one or more sections, provisions, clauses, phrases, or words of this act * or the application of this act * would be declared unenforceable, unconstitutional, or invalid. (L. 2026 H.B. 2637 & 3155 § 1) * "This act" (H.B. 2637 & 3155, 2026) contained numerous sections. Consult Disposition of Sections table for a definitive listing.

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.1006 Severability clause for S.B. 888, 2026.

1.1006. Severability clause for S.B. 888, 2026. — In the event that any section, provision, clause, phrase, or word of this act * or the application thereof is declared invalid under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Missouri, it is the intent of the general assembly that the remaining sections of this act * remain in force and effect as far as they are capable of being carried into execution as intended by the general assembly. The general assembly hereby declares that it would have passed each section, provision, clause, phrase, or word thereof, irrespective of the fact that any one or more sections, provisions, clauses, phrases, or words of this act * or the application of this act * would be declared unenforceable, unconstitutional, or invalid. (L. 2026 S.B. 888 § 1) * "This act" (S.B. 888, 2026) contained numerous sections. Consult Disposition of Sections table for a definitive listing.

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.1007 Severability clause for S.B. 973, 2026.

1.1007. Severability clause for S.B. 973, 2026. — In the event that any section, provision, clause, phrase, or word of this act * or the application thereof is declared invalid under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Missouri, it is the intent of the general assembly that the remaining sections of this act * remain in force and effect as far as they are capable of being carried into execution as intended by the general assembly. The general assembly hereby declares that it would have passed each section, provision, clause, phrase, or word thereof, irrespective of the fact that any one or more sections, provisions, clauses, phrases, or words of this act * or the application of this act * would be declared unenforceable, unconstitutional, or invalid. (L. 2026 S.B. 973 § 1) * "This act" (S.B. 973, 2026) contained numerous sections. Consult Disposition of Sections table for a definitive listing.

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.1008 Nonseverability clause for S.B. 999, 2026.

1.1008. Nonseverability clause for S.B. 999, 2026. — Notwithstanding the provisions of section 1.140 to the contrary, the provisions of this act * shall be nonseverable, and if any provision is for any reason held to be invalid, such decision shall invalidate all of the remaining provisions of this act * . (L. 2026 S.B. 999 § B) * "This act" (S.B. 999, 2026) contained numerous sections. Consult Disposition of Sections table for a definitive listing.

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.1009 Severability clause for S.B. 1233, 2026.

1.1009. Severability clause for S.B. 1233, 2026. — In the event that any section, provision, clause, phrase, or word of this act * or the application thereof is declared invalid under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of Missouri, it is the intent of the general assembly that the remaining sections of this act * remain in force and effect as far as they are capable of being carried into execution as intended by the general assembly. The general assembly hereby declares that it would have passed each section, provision, clause, phrase, or word thereof, irrespective of the fact that any one or more sections, provisions, clauses, phrases, or words of this act * or the application of this act * would be declared unenforceable, unconstitutional, or invalid. (L. 2026 S.B. 1233 § 1) * "This act" (S.B. 1233, 2026) contained numerous sections. Consult Disposition of Sections table for a definitive listing.

Mo. Rev. Stat. § 1.1010 Severability clause for H.B. 1421, 2026.

1.1010. Severability clause for H.B. 1421, 2026. — In the event that any section, provision, clause, phrase, or word of this act * or the application thereof is declared invalid under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State of Missouri, whether on procedural or substantive grounds, it is the intent of the general assembly that the remaining sections of this act * remain in force and effect as far as they are capable of being carried into execution as intended by the general assembly. The general assembly hereby declares that it would have passed each section, provision, clause, phrase, or word thereof, irrespective of the fact that any one or more sections, provisions, clauses, phrases, or words of this act * or the application of this act * would be declared unenforceable, unconstitutional, or invalid. (L. 2026 S.B. 1421 § C) * "This act" (S.B. 1421, 2026) contained numerous sections. Consult Disposition of Sections table for a definitive listing.
Source: Open US Law by Vaquill AI (CC BY 4.0)URL: https://revisor.mo.gov/main/OneChapter.aspx?chapter=1Fetched: 10/17/2026