N.J. Stat. tit. 2C, ch. 11

in effect

N.J. Stat. § 2C:11-1 Definitions

2C:11-1. Definitions. In chapters 11 through 15, unless a different meaning plainly is required: a. "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition; b. "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ; c. "Deadly weapon" means any firearm or other weapon, device, instrument, material or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which in the manner it is used or is intended to be used, is known to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury or which in the manner it is fashioned would lead the victim reasonably to believe it to be capable of producing death or serious bodily injury; d. "Significant bodily injury" means bodily injury which creates a temporary loss of the function of any bodily member or organ or temporary loss of any one of the five senses. L.1978, c.95; amended 1979,c.178,s.19; 1981,c.384,s.1; 1995,c.307,s.1.

N.J. Stat. § 2C:11-2 Criminal homicide.

2C:11-2. Criminal homicide. a. A person is guilty of criminal homicide if he purposely, knowingly, recklessly or, under the circumstances set forth in N.J.S.2C:11-5 or section 1 of P.L.2017, c.165 (C.2C:11-5.3), causes the death of another human being. b. Criminal homicide is murder, manslaughter or death by auto or vessel. amended 1979, c.178, s.20; 2017, c.165, s.2.

N.J. Stat. § 2C:11-2.1 Elapse of time between assault and death, prosecution for criminal homicide

The length of time which has elapsed between the initial assault and the death of the victim shall not be a bar to prosecution of the actor for criminal homicide. L.1979, c. 363, s. 1, eff. Feb. 1, 1980.

N.J. Stat. § 2C:11-3 Murder.

2C:11-3. Murder. a. Except as provided in N.J.S.2C:11-4, criminal homicide constitutes murder when: (1) The actor purposely causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death; or (2) The actor knowingly causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death; or (3) It is committed when the actor, acting either alone or with one or more other persons, is engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping, carjacking, criminal escape or terrorism pursuant to section 2 of P.L.2002, c.26 (C.2C:38-2), and in the course of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom, any person causes the death of a person other than one of the participants; except that in any prosecution under this subsection, in which the defendant was not the only participant in the underlying crime, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant: (a) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command, importune, cause or aid the commission thereof; and (b) Was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any instrument, article or substance readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding persons; and (c) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was armed with such a weapon, instrument, article or substance; and (d) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical injury. b. (1) Murder is a crime of the first degree but a person convicted of murder shall be sentenced, except as provided in paragraphs (2), (3) and (4) of this subsection, by the court to a term of 30 years, during which the person shall not be eligible for parole, or be sentenced to a specific term of years which shall be between 30 years and life imprisonment of which the person shall serve 30 years before being eligible for parole. (2) If the victim was a law enforcement officer and was murdered while performing his official duties or was murdered because of his status as a law enforcement officer, the person convicted of that murder shall be sentenced by the court to a term of life imprisonment, during which the person shall not be eligible for parole. (3) A person convicted of murder shall be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole if the murder was committed under all of the following circumstances: (a) The victim is less than 18 years old; and (b) The act is committed in the course of the commission, whether alone or with one or more persons, of a violation of N.J.S.2C:14-2 or N.J.S.2C:14-3. (4) Any person convicted under subsection a.(1) or (2) who committed the homicidal act by his own conduct; or who as an accomplice procured the commission of the offense by payment or promise of payment of anything of pecuniary value; or who, as a leader of a narcotics trafficking network as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-3 and in furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated in N.J.S.2C:35-3, commanded or by threat or promise solicited the commission of the offense, or, if the murder occurred during the commission of the crime of terrorism, any person who committed the crime of terrorism, shall be sentenced by the court to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole, which sentence shall be served in a maximum security prison, if a jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that any of the following aggravating factors exist: (a) The defendant has been convicted, at any time, of another murder. For purposes of this section, a conviction shall be deemed final when sentence is imposed and may be used as an aggravating factor regardless of whether it is on appeal; (b) In the commission of the murder, the defendant purposely or knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim; (c) The murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated assault to the victim; (d) The defendant committed the murder as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt of anything of pecuniary value; (e) The defendant procured the commission of the murder by payment or promise of payment of anything of pecuniary value; (f) The murder was committed for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, punishment or confinement for another offense committed by the defendant or another; (g) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit murder, robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping, carjacking or the crime of contempt in violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-9; (h) The defendant murdered a public servant, as defined in N.J.S.2C:27-1, while the victim was engaged in the performance of his official duties, or because of the victim's status as a public servant; (i) The defendant: (i) as a leader of a narcotics trafficking network as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-3 and in furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated in N.J.S.2C:35-3, committed, commanded or by threat or promise solicited the commission of the murder or (ii) committed the murder at the direction of a leader of a narcotics trafficking network as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-3 in furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated in N.J.S.2C:35-3; (j) The homicidal act that the defendant committed or procured was in violation of paragraph (1) of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:17-2; (k) The victim was less than 14 years old; or (l) The murder was committed during the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, terrorism pursuant to section 2 of P.L.2002, c.26 (C.2C:38-2). (5) A juvenile who has been tried as an adult and convicted of murder shall be sentenced pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection. c. (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2007, c.204). d. (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2007, c.204). e. (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2007, c.204). f. (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2007, c.204). g. (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2007, c.204). h. (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2007, c.204). i. For purposes of this section the term "homicidal act" shall mean conduct that causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death. j. In a sentencing proceeding conducted pursuant to this section, the display of a photograph of the victim taken before the homicide shall be permitted. amended 1979, c.178, s.21; 1981, c.290, s.12; 1982, c.111, s.1; 1985, c.178, s.2; 1985, c.478; 1992, c.5; 1992, c.76; 1993, c.27; 1993, c.111; 1993, c.206; 1994, c.132; 1995, c.123; 1996, c.115, s.1; 1997, c.60, s.1; 1998, c.25; 1999, c.209; 1999, c.294, s.1; 2000, c.88; 2002, c.26, s.10; 2007, c.204, s.1; 2017, c.150.

N.J. Stat. § 2C:11-3a Adoption of court rules concerning photo of homicide victim

3. The Supreme Court may adopt court rules pertaining to the display of a photograph of a homicide victim in court as permitted in N.J.S.2C:11-3 concerning murder and in section 3 of P.L.1985, c.249 (C.52:4B-36) concerning other homicide prosecutions. These court rules may include, but shall not be limited to, the following matters to ensure uniformity in all homicide prosecutions: a. the size of the photograph; b. the duration of the display; c. the location of the photograph in the courtroom. L.1999,c.294,s.3.

N.J. Stat. § 2C:11-3b Resentencing to term of life imprisonment.

2. An inmate sentenced to death prior to the date of the enactment of this act, upon motion to the sentencing court and waiver of any further appeals related to sentencing, shall be resentenced to a term of life imprisonment during which the defendant shall not be eligible for parole. Such sentence shall be served in a maximum security prison. Any such motion to the sentencing court shall be made within 60 days of the enactment of this act. If the motion is not made within 60 days the inmate shall remain under the sentence of death previously imposed by the sentencing court. L.2007,c.204,s.2.

N.J. Stat. § 2C:11-3c Restitution.

3. In addition to the provisions of any other law requiring restitution, a person convicted of murder pursuant to N.J.S.2C:11-3 shall be required to pay restitution to the nearest surviving relative of the victim. The court shall determine the amount and duration of the restitution pursuant to N.J.S.2C:43-3 and the provisions of chapter 46 of Title 2C of the New Jersey Statutes. L.2007,c.204,s.3.

N.J. Stat. § 2C:11-4 Manslaughter.

2C:11-4. Manslaughter. a. Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated manslaughter when: (1) The actor recklessly causes death under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life; or (2) The actor causes the death of another person while fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer in violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-2. Notwithstanding the provision of any other law to the contrary, the actor shall be strictly liable for a violation of this paragraph upon proof of a violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-2 which resulted in the death of another person. As used in this paragraph, "actor" shall not include a passenger in a motor vehicle. b. Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when: (1) It is committed recklessly; or (2) A homicide which would otherwise be murder under N.J.S.2C:11-3 is committed in the heat of passion resulting from a reasonable provocation. The discovery of, knowledge about, or potential disclosure of the homicide victim's actual or perceived gender identity or expression, or affectional or sexual orientation, which occurred under any circumstances, including but not limited to circumstances in which the victim made an unwanted, non-forcible romantic or sexual advance toward the actor, or if the victim and actor dated or had a romantic or sexual relationship, shall not be reasonable provocation pursuant to this paragraph. As used herein, the terms "gender identity or expression" and "affectional or sexual orientation" shall have the same meaning as in section 5 of P.L.1945, c.169 (C.10:5-5). c. Aggravated manslaughter under paragraph (1) of subsection a. of this section is a crime of the first degree and upon conviction thereof a person may, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:43-6, be sentenced to an ordinary term of imprisonment between 10 and 30 years. Aggravated manslaughter under paragraph (2) of subsection a. of this section is a crime of the first degree. Manslaughter is a crime of the second degree. amended 1979, c.178, s.21A; 1981, c.290, s.13; 1986, c.172, s.1; 1991, c.341, s.1; 2001, c.412; 2019, c.468.

N.J. Stat. § 2C:11-5 Death by auto or vessel.

2C:11-5. Death by auto or vessel. a. Criminal homicide constitutes reckless vehicular homicide when it is caused by driving a vehicle or vessel recklessly. Proof that the defendant fell asleep while driving or was driving after having been without sleep for a period in excess of 24 consecutive hours may give rise to an inference that the defendant was driving recklessly. Proof that the defendant was driving while intoxicated in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or was operating a vessel under the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of section 3 of P.L.1952, c.157 (C.12:7-46) shall give rise to an inference that the defendant was driving recklessly. Proof that the defendant was operating a hand-held wireless telephone while driving a motor vehicle in violation of section 1 of P.L.2003, c.310 (C.39:4-97.3) may give rise to an inference that the defendant was driving recklessly. Proof that the defendant failed to maintain a lane in violation of R.S.39:4-88 may give rise to an inference that the defendant was driving recklessly. Nothing in this section shall be construed to in any way limit the conduct or conditions that may be found to constitute driving a vehicle or vessel recklessly. b. Except as provided in paragraphs (3) and (5) of this subsection, reckless vehicular homicide is a crime of the second degree. (1) If the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while under the influence of any intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug, or with a blood alcohol concentration at or above the prohibited level as prescribed in R.S.39:4-50, or if the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while his driver's license or reciprocity privilege was suspended or revoked for any violation of R.S.39:4-50, section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a), by the Chief Administrator of the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission pursuant to P.L.1982, c.85 (C.39:5-30a et seq.), or by the court for a violation of R.S.39:4-96, the defendant shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment by the court. The term of imprisonment shall include the imposition of a minimum term. The minimum term shall be fixed at, or between, one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed by the court or three years, whichever is greater, during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole. (2) The court shall not impose a mandatory sentence pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection unless the grounds therefor have been established at a hearing. At the hearing, which may occur at the time of sentencing, the prosecutor shall establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while under the influence of any intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug, or with a blood alcohol concentration at or above the level prescribed in R.S.39:4-50 or that the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while his driver's license or reciprocity privilege was suspended or revoked for any violation of R.S.39:4-50, section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a), by the Chief Administrator of the New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission pursuant to P.L.1982, c.85 (C.39:5-30a et seq.), or by the court for a violation of R.S.39:4-96. In making its findings, the court shall take judicial notice of any evidence, testimony or information adduced at the trial, plea hearing, or other court proceedings and shall also consider the presentence report and any other relevant information. (3) Reckless vehicular homicide is a crime of the first degree if the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a) while: (a) on any school property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board, or within 1,000 feet of such school property; (b) driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 if the municipality, by ordinance or resolution, has designated the school crossing as such; or (c) driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 knowing that juveniles are present if the municipality has not designated the school crossing as such by ordinance or resolution. A map or true copy of a map depicting the location and boundaries of the area on or within 1,000 feet of any property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board produced pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1987, c.101 (C.2C:35-7) may be used in a prosecution under subparagraph (a) of this paragraph. It shall be no defense to a prosecution for a violation of subparagraph (a) or (b) of this paragraph that the defendant was unaware that the prohibited conduct took place while on or within 1,000 feet of any school property or while driving through a school crossing. Nor shall it be a defense to a prosecution under subparagraph (a) or (b) of this paragraph that no juveniles were present on the school property or crossing zone at the time of the offense or that the school was not in session. (4) If the defendant was operating the auto or vessel in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c.512 (C.39:4-50.4a), the defendant's license to operate a motor vehicle shall be suspended for a period of between five years and life, which period shall commence upon completion of any prison sentence imposed upon that person. (5) Reckless Vehicular homicide is a crime of the third degree if the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant did not commit any conduct constituting driving a vehicle or vessel recklessly other than failing to maintain a lane in violation of R.S.39:4-88. c. For good cause shown, the court may, in accepting a plea of guilty under this section, order that such plea not be evidential in any civil proceeding. d. Nothing herein shall be deemed to preclude, if the evidence so warrants, an indictment and conviction for aggravated manslaughter under the provisions of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:11-4. As used in this section, "auto or vessel" means all means of conveyance propelled otherwise than by muscular power. e. Any person who violates paragraph (3) of subsection b. of this section shall forfeit the auto or vessel used in the commission of the offense, unless the defendant can establish at a hearing, which may occur at the time of sentencing, by a preponderance of the evidence that such forfeiture would constitute a serious hardship to the family of the defendant that outweighs the need to deter such conduct by the defendant and others. In making its findings, the court shall take judicial notice of any evidence, testimony, or information adduced at the trial, plea hearing, or other court proceedings and shall also consider the presentence report and any other relevant information. Forfeiture pursuant to this subsection shall be in addition to, and not in lieu of, civil forfeiture pursuant to chapter 64 of this Title. amended 1981, c.312, s.1; 1983, c.39; 1984, c.212; 1985, c.97, s.1; 1988, c.75, s.1; 1989, c.211; 1991, c.237, s.1; 1995, c.285; 1999, c.185, s.1; 2003, c.143; 2012, c.22, s.1; 2017, c.165, s.3; 2017, c.372.

N.J. Stat. § 2C:11-5.1 Knowingly leaving scene of accident under certain circumstances; crime, sentencing.

1. A motor vehicle operator who knows he is involved in an accident and knowingly leaves the scene of that accident under circumstances that violate the provisions of R.S.39:4-129 shall be guilty of a crime of the second degree if the accident results in the death of another person. If the evidence so warrants, nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude an indictment and conviction for aggravated manslaughter under the provisions of N.J.S.2C:11-4 , reckless vehicular homicide under the provisions of N.J.S.2C:11-5 or strict liability vehicular homicide under the provisions of section 1 of P.L.2017, c.165 (C.2C:11-5.3). Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S.2C:1-8 or any other provisions of law, a conviction arising under this section shall not merge with a conviction for aggravated manslaughter under the provisions of N.J.S.2C:11-4, reckless vehicular homicide under the provisions of N.J.S.2C:11-5 or strict liability vehicular homicide under the provisions of section 1 of P.L.2017, c.165 (C.2C:11-5.3) and a separate sentence shall be imposed upon each such conviction. Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S.2C:44-5 or any other provisions of law, when the court imposes multiple sentences of imprisonment for more than one offense, those sentences shall run consecutively. For the purposes of this section, neither knowledge of the death nor knowledge of the violation are elements of the offense and it shall not be a defense that the operator of the motor vehicle was unaware of the death or of the provisions of R.S.39:4-129. L.1997, c.111, s.1; amended 2003, c.55, s.2; 2007, c.83, s.1; 2017, c.165, s.4.

N.J. Stat. § 2C:11-5.2 Leaving scene of boating accident; crime, sentencing.

1. a. Whenever any vessel, as defined in section 2 of P.L.1995, c.401 (C.12:7-71), is involved in an accident upon the waters of this State, and the operator of that vessel knows he is involved in an accident and knowingly leaves the scene of that accident under circumstances that violate the provisions of section 11 of P.L.1962, c.73 (C.12:7-34.46), that operator shall be guilty of a crime of the second degree if the accident results in the death of another person, and shall be guilty of a crime of the third degree if the accident results in serious bodily injury to another person. The presumption of nonimprisonment set forth in N.J.S.2C:44-1 shall not apply to persons convicted under the provisions of this section. b. If the evidence so warrants, nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude an indictment and conviction for aggravated manslaughter under the provisions of N.J.S.2C:11-4, reckless vehicular homicide under the provisions of N.J.S.2C:11-5 or strict liability vehicular homicide under the provisions of section 1 of P.L.2017, c.165 (C.2C:11-5.3). c. Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S.2C:1-8 or any other provisions of law, a conviction arising under this section shall not merge with a conviction for aggravated manslaughter under the provisions of N.J.S.2C:11-4 , reckless vehicular homicide under the provisions of N.J.S.2C:11-5 or strict liability vehicular homicide under the provisions of section 1 of P.L.2017, c.165 (C.2C:11-5.3) and a separate sentence shall be imposed upon each such conviction. d. Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S.2C:44-5 or any other provisions of law, when the court imposes multiple sentences of imprisonment for more than one offense, those sentences shall run consecutively. e. For the purposes of this section, knowledge of the death, knowledge of the serious bodily injury, or knowledge of the violation shall not be elements of the offense and it shall not be a defense that the operator of the vessel was unaware of the death or of the provisions of section 11 of P.L.1962, c.73 (C.12:7-34.46). L.2014, c.17, s.1; amended 2017, c.165, s.5.

N.J. Stat. § 2C:11-5.3 Strict liability vehicular homicide.

1. a. Criminal homicide constitutes strict liability vehicular homicide when it is caused by driving a vehicle while intoxicated in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or operating a vessel under the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of section 3 of P.L.1952, c.157 (C.12:7-46). b. Strict liability vehicular homicide is a crime of the third degree, but the presumption of nonimprisonment set forth in subsection e. of N.J.S.2C:44-1 shall not apply. c. The provisions of N.J.S.2C:2-3 governing the causal relationship between conduct and result shall not apply in a prosecution under this section. For purposes of this offense, the defendant's act of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or operating a vessel under the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of section 3 of P.L.1952, c.157 (C.12:7-46) is the cause of death when: (1) The operation of the motor vehicle or vessel is an antecedent but for which the death would not have occurred; and (2) The death was not: (a) too remote in its occurrence as to have a just bearing on the defendant's liability; or (b) too dependent upon the conduct of another person which was unrelated to the defendant's operation of a motor vehicle or vessel as to have a just bearing on the defendant's liability. d. It shall not be a defense to a prosecution under this section that the decedent contributed to his own death by reckless or negligent conduct or operation of a motor vehicle or vessel. e. Nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude, if the evidence so warrants, an indictment and conviction for any other offense. L.2017, c.165, s.1.

N.J. Stat. § 2C:11-6 Aiding suicide.

2C:11-6. Aiding Suicide. A person who purposely aids another to commit suicide is guilty of a crime of the second degree if his conduct causes such suicide or an attempted suicide, and otherwise of a crime of the fourth degree. Any action taken in accordance with the provisions of P.L.2019, c.59 (C.26:16-1 et al.) shall not constitute suicide or assisted suicide. amended 2019, c.59, s.28.

Source: Open US Law by Vaquill AI (CC BY 4.0)URL: https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislative-activity/statutesFetched: 10/17/2026