USC Subchapter V

in effect

50 U.S.C. § 2361 Sense of Congress concerning contracting policy

It is the sense of Congress that the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of State, to the extent authorized by law, should— (1) contract directly with suppliers in independent states of the former Soviet Union when such action would—(A) result in significant savings of the programs referred to in subchapter III; and (B) substantially expedite completion of the programs referred to in subchapter III; and (2) seek means to use innovative contracting approaches to avoid delay and increase the effectiveness of such programs and of the exercise of such authorities.

50 U.S.C. § 2362 Transfers of allocations among cooperative threat reduction programs

Congress finds that— (1) the various Cooperative Threat Reduction programs are being carried out at different rates in the various countries covered by such programs; and (2) it is necessary to authorize transfers of funding allocations among the various programs in order to maximize the effectiveness of United States efforts under such programs.

50 U.S.C. § 2363 Sense of Congress concerning assistance to states of former Soviet Union

It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the Cooperative Threat Reduction programs and other United States programs authorized in title XIV of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 (Public Law 102–484; 22 U.S.C. 5901 et seq.) should be expanded by offering assistance under those programs to other independent states of the former Soviet Union in addition to Russia, Ukraine, Kazakstan, and Belarus; and (2) the President should offer assistance to additional independent states of the former Soviet Union in each case in which the participation of such states would benefit national security interests of the United States by improving border controls and safeguards over materials and technology associated with weapons of mass destruction.

50 U.S.C. § 2364 Purchase of low-enriched uranium derived from Russian highly enriched uranium

(a) Sense of CongressIt is the sense of Congress that the allies of the United States and other nations should participate in efforts to ensure that stockpiles of weapons-grade nuclear material are reduced. (b) Actions by Secretary of StateCongress urges the Secretary of State to encourage, in consultation with the Secretary of Energy, other countries to purchase low-enriched uranium that is derived from highly enriched uranium extracted from Russian nuclear weapons.

50 U.S.C. § 2365 Sense of Congress concerning purchase, packaging, and transportation of fissile materials at risk of theft

It is the sense of Congress that— (1) the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Secretary of State should purchase, package, and transport to secure locations weapons-grade nuclear materials from a stockpile of such materials if such officials determine that—(A) there is a significant risk of theft of such materials; and (B) there is no reasonable and economically feasible alternative for securing such materials; and (2) if it is necessary to do so in order to secure the materials, the materials should be imported into the United States, subject to the laws and regulations that are applicable to the importation of such materials into the United States.

50 U.S.C. § 2367 Reports on acquisition of technology relating to weapons of mass destruction and the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles

(a) Annual reportNot later than January 30 of each year, the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the following:(1) The threats posed to the United States and allies of the United States—(A) by weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles; and (B) by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles. (2) The acquisition by foreign countries during the preceding 12 months of dual-use and other technology useful for the development or production of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons) and advanced conventional munitions. (3) Any trends with respect to the acquisition described in paragraph (2). (b) Matters includedEach report submitted under subsection (a) shall include the following:(1) Identification of each foreign country and non-State organization that possesses weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, or cruise missiles, and a description of such weapons and missiles with respect to each such foreign country and non-State organization. (2) A description of the means by which any foreign country and non-State organization that has achieved, or is making progress toward achieving, capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, or cruise missiles has achieved, or is making progress toward achieving, that capability, including a description of the international network of foreign countries and private entities that provide assistance to foreign countries and non-State organizations in achieving that capability. (3) An examination of the doctrines that guide the use of weapons of mass destruction in each foreign country that possesses such weapons. (4) An examination of the existence and implementation of the control mechanisms that exist with respect to nuclear weapons in each foreign country that possesses such weapons. (5) Identification of each foreign country and non-State organization that seeks to acquire or develop (indigenously or with foreign assistance) weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, or cruise missiles, and a description of such weapons and missiles with respect to each such foreign country and non-State organization. (6) An assessment of various possible timelines for the achievement by foreign countries and non-State organizations of capability with respect to weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles, taking into account the probability of whether foreign countries that are a party to the Missile Technology Control Regime will comply with and enforce the regime, the potential availability of assistance from foreign technical specialists, and the potential for independent sales by foreign private entities without authorization from their national governments. (7) For each foreign country or non-State organization that has not achieved the capability to target the United States or its territories with weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, or cruise missiles as of January 2, 2013, an estimate of how far in advance the United States is likely to be warned before such foreign country or non-State organization achieves that capability. (8) For each foreign country or non-State organization that has not achieved the capability to target members of the Armed Forces of the United States deployed abroad with weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, or cruise missiles as of January 2, 2013, an estimate of how far in advance the United States is likely to be warned before such foreign country or non-State organization achieves that capability. (c) ClassificationEach report submitted under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex. (d) Appropriate congressional committees definedIn this section, the term “appropriate congressional committees” means the following:(1) The congressional defense committees. (2) The congressional intelligence committees (as defined in section 3003 of this title). (3) The Speaker and the minority leader of the House of Representatives and the majority leader and the minority leader of the Senate.

50 U.S.C. § 2368 Annual reports on the proliferation of missiles and essential components of nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons

(a) ReportNot later than March 1, 2003, and annually thereafter, the President shall transmit to the designated congressional committees an annual report on the transfer by any country of weapons, technology, components, or materials that can be used to deliver, manufacture (including research and experimentation), or weaponize nuclear, biological, chemical or radiological weapons (in this section referred to as “NBC weapons”) to any country other than a country referred to in subsection (d) that is seeking to possess or otherwise acquire such weapons, technology, or materials, or other system that the Secretary or the Secretary of Defense has reason to believe could be used to develop, acquire, or deliver NBC weapons. (b) Matters to be includedEach such report shall include—(1) the transfer of all aircraft, cruise missiles, artillery weapons, unguided rockets and multiple rocket systems, and related bombs, shells, warheads and other weaponization technology and materials that the Secretary or the Secretary of Defense has reason to believe may be intended for the delivery of NBC weapons; (2) international transfers of MTCR equipment or technology to any country that is seeking to acquire such equipment or any other system that the Secretary or the Secretary of Defense has reason to believe may be used to deliver NBC weapons; and (3) the transfer of technology, test equipment, radioactive materials, feedstocks and cultures, and all other specialized materials that the Secretary or the Secretary of Defense has reason to believe could be used to manufacture NBC weapons. (c) Content of reportEach such report shall include the following with respect to preceding 11 So in original. Probably should be preceded by “the”. calendar year:(1) The status of missile, aircraft, and other NBC weapons delivery and weaponization programs in any such country, including efforts by such country or by any subnational group to acquire MTCR-controlled equipment, NBC-capable aircraft, or any other weapon or major weapon component which may be utilized in the delivery of NBC weapons, whose primary use is the delivery of NBC weapons, or that the Secretary or the Secretary of Defense has reason to believe could be used to deliver NBC weapons. (2) The status of NBC weapons development, acquisition, manufacture, stockpiling, and deployment programs in any such country, including efforts by such country or by any subnational group to acquire essential test equipment, manufacturing equipment and technology, weaponization equipment and technology, and radioactive material, feedstocks or components of feedstocks, and biological cultures and toxins. (3) A description of assistance provided by any person or government, after September 30, 2002, to any such country or subnational group in the acquisition or development of—(A) NBC weapons; (B) missile systems, as defined in the MTCR or that the Secretary or the Secretary of Defense has reason to believe may be used to deliver NBC weapons; and (C) aircraft and other delivery systems and weapons that the Secretary or the Secretary of Defense has reason to believe could be used to deliver NBC weapons. (4) A listing of those persons and countries that continue to provide such equipment or technology described in paragraph (3) to any country or subnational group as of the date of submission of the report, including the extent to which foreign persons and countries were found to have knowingly and materially assisted such programs. (5) A description of the use of, or substantial preparations to use, the equipment of technology described in paragraph (3) by any foreign country or subnational group. (6) A description of the diplomatic measures that the United States, and that other adherents to the MTCR and other arrangements affecting the acquisition and delivery of NBC weapons, have made with respect to activities and private persons and governments suspected of violating the MTCR and such other arrangements. (7) An analysis of the effectiveness of the regulatory and enforcement regimes of the United States and other countries that adhere to the MTCR and other arrangements affecting the acquisition and delivery of NBC weapons in controlling the export of MTCR and other NBC weapons and delivery system equipment or technology. (8) A summary of advisory opinions issued under section 4612(b)(4) of this title and under section 2797b(d) of title 22. (9) An explanation of United States policy regarding the transfer of MTCR equipment or technology to foreign missile programs, including programs involving launches of space vehicles. (10) A description of each transfer by any person or government during the preceding 12-month period which is subject to sanctions under the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 (title XVI of Public Law 102–484). (d) ExclusionsThe countries excluded under subsection (a) are Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. (e) Classification of reportThe Secretary shall make every effort to submit all of the information required by this section in unclassified form. Whenever the Secretary submits any such information in classified form, the Secretary shall submit such classified information in an addendum and shall also submit concurrently a detailed summary, in unclassified form, of that classified information. (f) DefinitionsIn this section:(1) Designated congressional committeesThe term “designated congressional committees” means—(A) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives; and (B) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. (2) Missile; MTCR; MTCR equipment or technologyThe terms “missile”, “MTCR”, and “MTCR equipment or technology” have the meanings given those terms in section 2797c of title 22. (3) PersonThe term “person” means any United States or foreign individual, partnership, corporation, or other form of association, or any of its successor entities, parents, or subsidiaries. (4) Weaponize; weaponizationThe term “weaponize” or “weaponization” means to incorporate into, or the incorporation into, usable ordnance or other militarily useful means of delivery.

50 U.S.C. § 2370 Notification of Committees on Armed Services with respect to certain nonproliferation and proliferation activities

(a) Notification with respect to nonproliferation activitiesThe Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of State, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission shall keep the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives informed with respect to—(1) any activities undertaken by any such Secretary or the Commission to carry out the purposes and policies of the Secretaries and the Commission with respect to nonproliferation programs; and (2) any other activities undertaken by any such Secretary or the Commission to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or the means of delivery of such weapons. (b) Notification with respect to proliferation activities in foreign nations(1) In generalThe Director of National Intelligence shall keep the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives fully and currently informed with respect to any activities of foreign nations that are significant with respect to the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons or the means of delivery of such weapons. (2) Fully and currently informed definedFor purposes of paragraph (1), the term “fully and currently informed” means the transmittal of credible information with respect to an activity described in such paragraph not later than 60 days after becoming aware of the activity.