18 Pa.C.S. Ch. 3

in effect

18 Pa.C.S. § 3 Severability.

If any provision of this act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the act which can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable. § 4. Applicability of Statutory Construction Act. Sections 72 and 94 of the Statutory Construction Act shall not be applicable to any provision of Title 18 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes (relating to crimes and offenses) as added by this act, except Article G (relating to miscellaneous offenses) of Part II (relating to definition of specific offenses). References in Text. The Statutory Construction Act of 1937, referred to in text, was repealed December 6, 1972, P.L.1339, No.290, effective immediately, and the former provisions of sections 72 and 94 are now contained in sections 1952 and 1974, respectively, of Title 1 (General Provisions). § 6. Effective date. This act shall take effect January 1, 1972, or six months from the date of final enactment, whichever is later. Effective Date. The effective date of Act 334 was June 6, 1973. 1974, MARCH 26, P.L.213, NO.46 § 5. Severability. If any subparagraph, paragraph, or subsection of section 2502 of the "Crimes Code," as amended by this act, or any other provision of this act or the application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other subparagraphs, paragraphs, subsections, provisions or applications of the act which can be given effect without the invalid subparagraph, paragraph, subsection, provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this act are declared to be severable. 1976, DECEMBER 2, P.L.1230, NO.272 § 2. Severability. The provisions of this act shall not affect any act done, liability incurred or right accrued or vested, or affect any suit or prosecution pending or to be instituted to enforce any right or penalty or punish any offense under the authority of any act or part thereof repealed in this act. Explanatory Note. Act 272 amended section 3929 of Title 18. 1978, NOVEMBER 26, P.L.1316, NO.319 Explanatory Note. The provisions of Act 319 of 1978 which were formerly contained in this appendix are now contained in the appendix to Title 42 (Judiciary and Judicial Procedure). 1982, JUNE 18, P.L.537, NO.154

18 Pa.C.S. § 301 Requirement of voluntary act.

(a) General rule.--A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of which he is physically capable. (b) Omission as basis of liability.--Liability for the commission of an offense may not be based on an omission unaccompanied by action unless: (1) the omission is expressly made sufficient by the law defining the offense; or (2) a duty to perform the omitted act is otherwise imposed by law. (c) Possession as an act.--Possession is an act, within the meaning of this section, if the possessor knowingly procured or received the thing possessed or was aware of his control thereof for a sufficient period to have been able to terminate his possession. Cross References. Section 301 is referred to in section 305 of this title.

18 Pa.C.S. § 302 General requirements of culpability.

(a) Minimum requirements of culpability.--Except as provided in section 305 of this title (relating to limitations on scope of culpability requirements), a person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with respect to each material element of the offense. (b) Kinds of culpability defined.-- (1) A person acts intentionally with respect to a material element of an offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and (ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist. (2) A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense when: (i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances exist; and (ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result. (3) A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and intent of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation. (4) A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor's failure to perceive it, considering the nature and intent of his conduct and the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's situation. (c) Culpability required unless otherwise provided.--When the culpability sufficient to establish a material element of an offense is not prescribed by law, such element is established if a person acts intentionally, knowingly or recklessly with respect thereto. (d) Prescribed culpability requirement applies to all material elements.--When the law defining an offense prescribes the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of an offense, without distinguishing among the material elements thereof, such provision shall apply to all the material elements of the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears. (e) Substitutes for negligence, recklessness and knowledge.--When the law provides that negligence suffices to establish an element of an offense, such element also is established if a person acts intentionally or knowingly. When acting knowingly suffices to establish an element, such element also is established if a person acts intentionally. (f) Requirement of intent satisfied if intent is conditional.--When a particular intent is an element of an offense, the element is established although such intent is conditional, unless the condition negatives the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense. (g) Requirement of willfulness satisfied by acting knowingly.--A requirement that an offense be committed willfully is satisfied if a person acts knowingly with respect to the material elements of the offense, unless a purpose to impose further requirements appears. (h) Culpability as to illegality of conduct.--Neither knowledge nor recklessness or negligence as to whether conduct constitutes an offense or as to the existence, meaning or application of the law determining the elements of an offense is an element of such offense, unless the definition of the offense or this title so provides. Cross References. Section 302 is referred to in sections 103, 305 of this title; section 6303 of Title 23 (Domestic Relations).

18 Pa.C.S. § 303 Causal relationship between conduct and result.

(a) General rule.--Conduct is the cause of a result when: (1) it is an antecedent but for which the result in question would not have occurred; and (2) the relationship between the conduct and result satisfies any additional causal requirements imposed by this title or by the law defining the offense. (b) Divergence between result designed or contemplated and actual result.--When intentionally or knowingly causing a particular result is an element of an offense, the element is not established if the actual result is not within the intent or the contemplation of the actor unless: (1) the actual result differs from that designed or contemplated as the case may be, only in the respect that a different person or different property is injured or affected or that the injury or harm designed or contemplated would have been more serious or more extensive than that caused; or (2) the actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as that designed or contemplated and is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a bearing on the actor's liability or on the gravity of his offense. (c) Divergence between probable and actual result.--When recklessly or negligently causing a particular result is an element of an offense, the element is not established if the actual result is not within the risk of which the actor is aware or, in the case of negligence, of which he should be aware unless: (1) the actual result differs from the probable result only in the respect that a different person or different property is injured or affected or that the probable injury or harm would have been more serious or more extensive than that caused; or (2) the actual result involves the same kind of injury or harm as the probable result and is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence to have a bearing on the liability of the actor or on the gravity of his offense. (d) Absolute liability.--When causing a particular result is a material element of an offense for which absolute liability is imposed by law, the element is not established unless the actual result is a probable consequence of the conduct of the actor. Cross References. Section 303 is referred to in section 2607 of this title.

18 Pa.C.S. § 304 Ignorance or mistake.

Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact, for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse, is a defense if: (1) the ignorance or mistake negatives the intent, knowledge, belief, recklessness, or negligence required to establish a material element of the offense; or (2) the law provides that the state of mind established by such ignorance or mistake constitutes a defense.

18 Pa.C.S. § 305 Limitations on scope of culpability requirements.

(a) When culpability requirements are inapplicable to summary offenses and to offenses defined by other statutes.--The requirements of culpability prescribed by section 301 of this title (relating to requirement of voluntary act) and section 302 of this title (relating to general requirements of culpability) do not apply to: (1) summary offenses, unless the requirement involved is included in the definition of the offense or the court determines that its application is consistent with effective enforcement of the law defining the offense; or (2) offenses defined by statutes other than this title, in so far as a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability for such offenses or with respect to any material element thereof plainly appears. (b) Effect of absolute liability in reducing grade of offense to summary offense.--Notwithstanding any other provision of existing law and unless a subsequent statute otherwise provides: (1) when absolute liability is imposed with respect to any material element of an offense defined by a statute other than this title and a conviction is based upon such liability, the offense constitutes a summary offense; and (2) although absolute liability is imposed by law with respect to one or more of the material elements of an offense defined by a statute other than this title, the culpable commission of the offense may be charged and proved, in which event negligence with respect to such elements constitutes sufficient culpability and the classification of the offense and the sentence that may be imposed therefor upon conviction are determined by section 106 of this title (relating to classes of offenses) and Chapter 11 of this title (relating to authorized disposition of offenders). Cross References. Section 305 is referred to in section 302 of this title.

18 Pa.C.S. § 306 Liability for conduct of another; complicity.

(a) General rule.--A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he is legally accountable, or both. (b) Conduct of another.--A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another person when: (1) acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible person to engage in such conduct; (2) he is made accountable for the conduct of such other person by this title or by the law defining the offense; or (3) he is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of the offense. (c) Accomplice defined.--A person is an accomplice of another person in the commission of an offense if: (1) with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense, he: (i) solicits such other person to commit it; or (ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning or committing it; or (2) his conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his complicity. (d) Culpability of accomplice.--When causing a particular result is an element of an offense, an accomplice in the conduct causing such result is an accomplice in the commission of that offense, if he acts with the kind of culpability, if any, with respect to that result that is sufficient for the commission of the offense. (e) Status of actor.--In any prosecution for an offense in which criminal liability of the defendant is based upon the conduct of another person pursuant to this section, it is no defense that the offense in question, as defined, can be committed only by a particular class or classes of persons, and the defendant, not belonging to such class or classes, is for that reason legally incapable of committing the offense in an individual capacity. (f) Exceptions.--Unless otherwise provided by this title or by the law defining the offense, a person is not an accomplice in an offense committed by another person if: (1) he is a victim of that offense; (2) the offense is so defined that his conduct is inevitably incident to its commission; or (3) he terminates his complicity prior to the commission of the offense and: (i) wholly deprives it of effectiveness in the commission of the offense; or (ii) gives timely warning to the law enforcement authorities or otherwise makes proper effort to prevent the commission of the offense. (g) Prosecution of accomplice only.--An accomplice may be convicted on proof of the commission of the offense and of his complicity therein, though the person claimed to have committed the offense has not been prosecuted or convicted or has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense or has an immunity to prosecution or conviction or has been acquitted. Cross References. Section 306 is referred to in sections 904, 3218, 6111 of this title; section 9711 of Title 42 (Judiciary and Judicial Procedure).

18 Pa.C.S. § 307 Liability of organizations and certain related persons.

(a) Corporations generally.--A corporation may be convicted of the commission of an offense if: (1) the offense is a summary offense or the offense is defined by a statute other than this title in which a legislative purpose to impose liability on corporations plainly appears and the conduct is performed by an agent of the corporation acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office or employment, except that if the law defining the offense designates the agents for whose conduct the corporation is accountable or the circumstances under which it is accountable, such provisions shall apply; (2) the offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of affirmative performance imposed on corporations by law; or (3) the commission of the offense was authorized, requested, commanded, performed or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office or employment. (b) Corporations, absolute liability.--When absolute liability is imposed for the commission of an offense, a legislative purpose to impose liability on a corporation shall be assumed, unless the contrary plainly appears. (c) Unincorporated associations.--An unincorporated association may be convicted of the commission of an offense if: (1) the offense is defined by a statute other than this title which expressly provides for the liability of such an association and the conduct is performed by an agent of the association acting in behalf of the association within the scope of his office or employment, except that if the law defining the offense designates the agents for whose conduct the association is accountable or the circumstances under which it is accountable, such provisions shall apply; or (2) the offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of affirmative performance imposed on associations by law. (d) Defenses.--In any prosecution of a corporation or an unincorporated association for the commission of an offense included within the terms of paragraph (a)(1) or paragraph (c)(1) of this section, other than an offense for which absolute liability has been imposed, it shall be a defense if the defendant proves by a preponderance of evidence that the high managerial agent having supervisory responsibility over the subject matter of the offense employed due diligence to prevent its commission. This subsection shall not apply if it is plainly inconsistent with the legislative purpose in defining the particular offense. (e) Persons acting or under a duty to act for organizations.-- (1) A person is legally accountable for any conduct he performs or causes to be performed in the name of a corporation or an unincorporated association or in its behalf to the same extent as if it were performed in his own name or behalf. (2) Whenever a duty to act is imposed by law upon a corporation or an unincorporated association, any agent of the corporation or association having primary responsibility for the discharge of the duty is legally accountable for a reckless omission to perform the required act to the same extent as if the duty were imposed by law directly upon himself. (3) When a person is convicted of an offense by reason of his legal accountability for the conduct of a corporation or an unincorporated association, he is subject to the sentence authorized by law when a natural person is convicted of an offense of the grade and the degree involved. (f) Definitions.--As used in this section the following words and phrases shall have the meanings given to them in this subsection: "Agent." Any director, officer, servant, employee or other person authorized to act in behalf of the corporation or association and, in the case of an unincorporated association, a member of such association. "Corporation." Does not include an entity organized as or by a governmental agency for the execution of a governmental program. "High managerial agent." An officer of a corporation or an unincorporated association, or, in the case of a partnership, a partner, or any other agent of a corporation or association having duties of such responsibility that his conduct may fairly be assumed to represent the policy of the corporation or association. Cross References. Section 307 is referred to in section 6305 of this title; sections 3345.1, 8510.1, 9002 of Title 75 (Vehicles).

18 Pa.C.S. § 308 Intoxication or drugged condition.

Neither voluntary intoxication nor voluntary drugged condition is a defense to a criminal charge, nor may evidence of such conditions be introduced to negative the element of intent of the offense, except that evidence of such intoxication or drugged condition of the defendant may be offered by the defendant whenever it is relevant to reduce murder from a higher degree to a lower degree of murder. (Apr. 7, 1976, P.L.72, No.32, eff. imd.)

18 Pa.C.S. § 309 Duress.

(a) General rule.--It is a defense that the actor engaged in the conduct charged to constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the person of another, which a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable to resist. (b) Exception.--The defense provided by subsection (a) of this section is unavailable if the actor recklessly placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that he would be subjected to duress. The defense is also unavailable if he was negligent in placing himself in such a situation, whenever negligence suffices to establish culpability for the offense charged. Cross References. Section 309 is referred to in section 9711 of Title 42 (Judiciary and Judicial Procedure).

18 Pa.C.S. § 310 Military orders.

It is a defense that the actor, in engaging in the conduct charged to constitute an offense, does no more than execute an order of his superior in the armed services which he does not know and cannot reasonably be expected to know to be unlawful.

18 Pa.C.S. § 311 Consent.

(a) General rule.--The consent of the victim to conduct charged to constitute an offense or to the result thereof is a defense if such consent negatives an element of the offense or precludes the infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense. (b) Consent to bodily injury.--When conduct is charged to constitute an offense because it causes or threatens bodily injury, consent to such conduct or to the infliction of such injury is a defense if: (1) the conduct and the injury are reasonably foreseeable hazards of joint participation in a lawful athletic contest or competitive sport; or (2) the consent establishes a justification for the conduct under Chapter 5 of this title (relating to general principles of justification). (c) Ineffective consent.--Unless otherwise provided by this title or by the law defining the offense, assent does not constitute consent if: (1) it is given by a person who is legally incapacitated to authorize the conduct charged to constitute the offense; (2) it is given by a person who by reason of youth, mental disease or defect or intoxication is manifestly unable or known by the actor to be unable to make a reasonable judgment as to the nature or harmfulness of the conduct charged to constitute the offense; (3) it is given by a person whose improvident consent is sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense; or (4) it is induced by force, duress or deception of a kind sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense. (Apr. 16, 1992, P.L.108, No.24, eff. 60 days) 1992 Amendment. Act 24 amended subsec. (c). Cross References. Section 311 is referred to in sections 2607, 2718 of this title.

18 Pa.C.S. § 312 De minimis infractions.

(a) General rule.--The court shall dismiss a prosecution if, having regard to the nature of the conduct charged to constitute an offense and the nature of the attendant circumstances, it finds that the conduct of the defendant: (1) was within a customary license or tolerance, neither expressly negatived by the person whose interest was infringed nor inconsistent with the purpose of the law defining the offense; (2) did not actually cause or threaten the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense or did so only to an extent too trivial to warrant the condemnation of conviction; or (3) presents such other extenuations that it cannot reasonably be regarded as envisaged by the General Assembly or other authority in forbidding the offense. (b) Written statement.--The court shall not dismiss a prosecution under this section without filing a written statement of its reasons, except that if the attorney for the Commonwealth is the moving party for such dismissal no such written statement need be filed. (June 22, 1978, P.L.494, No.73, eff. 60 days) 1978 Amendment. Act 73 amended subsec. (b).

18 Pa.C.S. § 313 Entrapment.

(a) General rule.--A public law enforcement official or a person acting in cooperation with such an official perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of obtaining evidence of the commission of an offense, he induces or encourages another person to engage in conduct constituting such offense by either: (1) making knowingly false representations designed to induce the belief that such conduct is not prohibited; or (2) employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a substantial risk that such an offense will be committed by persons other than those who are ready to commit it. (b) Burden of proof.--Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, a person prosecuted for an offense shall be acquitted if he proves by a preponderance of evidence that his conduct occurred in response to an entrapment. (c) Exception.--The defense afforded by this section is unavailable when causing or threatening bodily injury is an element of the offense charged and the prosecution is based on conduct causing or threatening such injury to a person other than the person perpetrating the entrapment.

18 Pa.C.S. § 314 Guilty but mentally ill.

(a) General rule.--A person who timely offers a defense of insanity in accordance with the Rules of Criminal Procedure may be found "guilty but mentally ill" at trial if the trier of facts finds, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the person is guilty of an offense, was mentally ill at the time of the commission of the offense and was not legally insane at the time of the commission of the offense. (b) Plea of guilty but mentally ill.--A person who waives his right to trial may plead guilty but mentally ill. No plea of guilty but mentally ill may be accepted by the trial judge until he has examined all reports prepared pursuant to the Rules of Criminal Procedure, has held a hearing on the sole issue of the defendant's mental illness at which either party may present evidence and is satisfied that the defendant was mentally ill at the time of the offense to which the plea is entered. If the trial judge refuses to accept a plea of guilty but mentally ill, the defendant shall be permitted to withdraw his plea. A defendant whose plea is not accepted by the court shall be entitled to a jury trial, except that if a defendant subsequently waives his right to a jury trial, the judge who presided at the hearing on mental illness shall not preside at the trial. (c) Definitions.--For the purposes of this section and 42 Pa.C.S. § 9727 (relating to disposition of persons found guilty but mentally ill): (1) "Mentally ill." One who as a result of mental disease or defect, lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law. (2) "Legal insanity." At the time of the commission of the act, the defendant was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong. (d) Common law M'Naghten's Rule preserved.--Nothing in this section shall be deemed to repeal or otherwise abrogate the common law defense of insanity (M'Naghten's Rule) in effect in this Commonwealth on the effective date of this section. (Dec. 15, 1982, P.L.1262, No.286, eff. 90 days) 1982 Amendment. Act 286 added section 314. Section 4 of Act 286 provided that Act 286 shall apply to all indictments or informations filed on or after the effective date of Act 286. Cross References. Section 314 is referred to in section 9727 of Title 42 (Judiciary and Judicial Procedure).

18 Pa.C.S. § 315 Insanity.

(a) General rule.--The mental soundness of an actor engaged in conduct charged to constitute an offense shall only be a defense to the charged offense when the actor proves by a preponderance of evidence that the actor was legally insane at the time of the commission of the offense. (b) Definition.--For purposes of this section, the phrase "legally insane" means that, at the time of the commission of the offense, the actor was laboring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing or, if the actor did know the quality of the act, that he did not know that what he was doing was wrong. (Dec. 15, 1982, P.L.1262, No.286, eff. 90 days) 1982 Amendment. Act 286 added section 315. Section 4 of Act 286 provided that Act 286 shall apply to all indictments or informations filed on or after the effective date of Act 286.

Source: Open US Law by Vaquill AI (CC BY 4.0)URL: https://www.palegis.us/statutes/consolidated/view-statute?txtType=HTM&ttl=18Fetched: 10/16/2026