USC Subchapter II

in effect

22 U.S.C. § 6321 Bilateral and multilateral initiatives

It is the sense of the Congress that in order to maintain and enhance international confidence in the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards and in other multilateral undertakings to halt the global proliferation of nuclear weapons, the United States should seek to negotiate with other nations and groups of nations, including the IAEA Board of Governors and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, to— (1) build international support for the principle that nuclear supply relationships must require purchasing nations to agree to full-scope international safeguards; (2) encourage each nuclear-weapon state within the meaning of the Treaty to undertake a comprehensive review of its own procedures for declassifying information relating to the design or production of nuclear explosive devices and to investigate any measures that would reduce the risk of such information contributing to nuclear weapons proliferation; (3) encourage the deferral of efforts to produce weapons-grade nuclear material for large-scale commercial uses until such time as safeguards are developed that can detect, on a timely and reliable basis, the diversion of significant quantities of such material for nuclear explosive purposes; (4) pursue greater financial support for the implementation and improvement of safeguards from all IAEA member nations with significant nuclear programs, particularly from those nations that are currently using or planning to use weapons-grade nuclear material for commercial purposes; (5) arrange for the timely payment of annual financial contributions by all members of the IAEA, including the United States; (6) pursue the elimination of international commerce in highly enriched uranium for use in research reactors while encouraging multilateral cooperation to develop and to use low-enriched alternative nuclear fuels; (7) oppose efforts by non-nuclear-weapon states to develop or use unsafeguarded nuclear fuels for purposes of naval propulsion; (8) pursue an international open skies arrangement that would authorize the IAEA to operate surveillance aircraft and would facilitate IAEA access to satellite information for safeguards verification purposes; (9) develop an institutional means for IAEA member nations to share intelligence material with the IAEA on possible safeguards violations without compromising national security or intelligence sources or methods; (10) require any exporter of a sensitive nuclear facility or sensitive nuclear technology to a non-nuclear-weapon state to notify the IAEA prior to export and to require safeguards over that facility or technology, regardless of its destination; and (11) seek agreement among the parties to the Treaty to apply IAEA safeguards in perpetuity and to establish new limits on the right to withdraw from the Treaty.

22 U.S.C. § 6322 IAEA internal reforms

In order to promote the early adoption of reforms in the implementation of the safeguards responsibilities of the IAEA, the Congress urges the President to negotiate with other nations and groups of nations, including the IAEA Board of Governors and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, to— (1) improve the access of the IAEA within nuclear facilities that are capable of producing, processing, or fabricating special nuclear material suitable for use in a nuclear explosive device; (2)(A) facilitate the IAEA’s efforts to meet and to maintain its own goals for detecting the diversion of nuclear materials and equipment, giving particular attention to facilities in which there are bulk quantities of plutonium; and (B) if it is not technically feasible for the IAEA to meet those detection goals in a particular facility, require the IAEA to declare publicly that it is unable to do so; (3) enable the IAEA to issue fines for violations of safeguards procedures, to pay rewards for information on possible safeguards violations, and to establish a “hot line” for the reporting of such violations and other illicit uses of weapons-grade nuclear material; (4) establish safeguards at facilities engaged in the manufacture of equipment or material that is especially designated or prepared for the processing, use, or production of special fissionable material or, in the case of non-nuclear-weapon states, of any nuclear explosive device; (5) establish safeguards over nuclear research and development activities and facilities; (6) implement special inspections of undeclared nuclear facilities, as provided for under existing safeguards procedures, and seek authority for the IAEA to conduct challenge inspections on demand at suspected nuclear sites; (7) expand the scope of safeguards to include tritium, uranium concentrates, and nuclear waste containing special fissionable material, and increase the scope of such safeguards on heavy water; (8) revise downward the IAEA’s official minimum amounts of nuclear material (“significant quantity”) needed to make a nuclear explosive device and establish these amounts as national rather than facility standards; (9) expand the use of full-time resident IAEA inspectors at sensitive fuel cycle facilities; (10) promote the use of near real time material accountancy in the conduct of safeguards at facilities that use, produce, or store significant quantities of special fissionable material; (11) develop with other IAEA member nations an agreement on procedures to expedite approvals of visa applications by IAEA inspectors; (12) provide the IAEA the additional funds, technical assistance, and political support necessary to carry out the goals set forth in this subsection; 11 So in original. Probably should be “section;”. and (13) make public the annual safeguards implementation report of the IAEA, establishing a public registry of commodities in international nuclear commerce, including dual-use goods, and creating a public repository of current nuclear trade control laws, agreements, regulations, and enforcement and judicial actions by IAEA member nations.

22 U.S.C. § 6323 Reporting requirement

(a) Report requiredThe President shall, in the report required by section 3281(a) of this title, describe—(1) the steps he has taken to implement sections 6321 and 6322 of this title, and (2) the progress that has been made and the obstacles that have been encountered in seeking to meet the objectives set forth in sections 6321 and 6322 of this title. (b) Contents of reportEach report under paragraph (1) 11 So in original. Probably should be “subsection (a) of this section”. shall describe—(1) the bilateral and multilateral initiatives that the President has taken during the period since April 30, 1994, in pursuit of each of the objectives set forth in sections 6321 and 6322 of this title; (2) any obstacles that have been encountered in the pursuit of those initiatives; (3) any additional initiatives that have been proposed by other countries or international organizations to strengthen the implementation of IAEA safeguards; (4) all activities of the Federal Government in support of the objectives set forth in sections 6321 and 6322 of this title; (5) any recommendations of the President on additional measures to enhance the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards; and (6) any initiatives that the President plans to take in support of each of the objectives set forth in sections 6321 and 6322 of this title.

22 U.S.C. § 6324 Definitions

As used in this subchapter— (1) the term “highly enriched uranium” means uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the isotope U–235; (2) the term “IAEA” means the International Atomic Energy Agency; (3) the term “near real time material accountancy” means a method of accounting for the location, quantity, and disposition of special fissionable material at facilities that store or process such material, in which verification of peaceful use is continuously achieved by means of frequent physical inventories and the use of in-process instrumentation; (4) the term “special fissionable material” has the meaning given that term by Article XX(1) of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, done at the Headquarters of the United Nations on October 26, 1956; (5) the term “the Treaty” means the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, signed at Washington, London, and Moscow on July 1, 1968; and (6) the terms “IAEA safeguards”, “non-nuclear-weapon state”, “nuclear explosive device”, and “special nuclear material” have the meanings given those terms in section 6305 of this title.