USC Chapter 114

USC Chapter 114
in effect

22 U.S.C. § 10701 Findings

Congress finds the following: (1) The Western Balkans countries (the Republic of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Kosovo, Montenegro, the Republic of North Macedonia and the Republic of Serbia) form a pluralistic, multi-ethnic region in the heart of Europe that is critical to the peace, stability, and prosperity of that continent. (2) Continued peace, stability, and prosperity in the Western Balkans is directly tied to the opportunities for democratic and economic advancement available to the citizens and residents of those six countries. (3) It is in the mutual interest of the United States and the countries of the Western Balkans to promote stable and sustainable economic growth and development in the region. (4) The reforms and integration with the European Union pursued by countries in the Western Balkans have led to significant democratic and economic progress in the region. (5) Despite economic progress, rates of poverty and unemployment in the Western Balkans remain higher than in neighboring European Union countries. (6) Out-migration, particularly of youth, is affecting demographics in each Western Balkans country, resulting in population decline in all six countries. (7) Implementing critical economic and governance reforms could help enable investment and employment opportunities in the Western Balkans, especially for youth, and can provide powerful tools for economic development and for encouraging broader participation in a political process that increases prosperity for all. (8) Existing regional economic efforts, such as the Common Regional Market, the Berlin Process, and the Open Balkan Initiative, could have the potential to improve the economic conditions in the Western Balkans, while promoting inclusion and transparency. (9) The Department of Commerce, through its Foreign Commercial Service, plays an important role in promoting and facilitating opportunities for United States investment. (10) Corruption, including among key political leaders, continues to plague the Western Balkans and represents one of the greatest impediments to further economic and political development in the region. (11) Disinformation campaigns targeting the Western Balkans undermine the credibility of its democratic institutions, including the integrity of its elections. (12) Vulnerability to cyberattacks or attacks on information and communication technology infrastructure increases risks to the functioning of government and the delivery of public services. (13) United States Cyber Command, the Department of State, and other Federal agencies play a critical role in defending the national security interests of the United States, including by deploying cyber hunt forward teams at the request of partner nations to reinforce their cyber defenses. (14) Securing domestic and international cyber networks and ICT infrastructure is a national security priority for the United States, which is exemplified by offices and programs across the Federal Government that support cybersecurity. (15) Corruption and disinformation proliferate in political environments marked by autocratic control or partisan conflict. (16) Dependence on Russian sources of fossil fuels and natural gas for the countries of the Western Balkans ties their economies and politics to the Russian Federation and inhibits their aspirations for European integration. (17) Reducing the reliance of the Western Balkans on Russian natural gas supplies and fossil fuels is in the national interest of the United States. (18) The growing influence of China in the Western Balkans could also have a deleterious impact on strategic competition, democracy, and economic integration with Europe. (19) In March 2022, President Biden launched the European Democratic Resilience Initiative to bolster democratic resilience, advance anti-corruption efforts, and defend human rights in Ukraine and its neighbors in response to Russia’s war of aggression. (20) The parliamentary and local elections held in Serbia on December 17, 2023, and their immediate aftermath are cause for deep concern about the state of Serbia’s democracy, including due to the final report of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, which—(A) found “unjust conditions” for the election; (B) found “numerous procedural deficiencies, including inconsistent application of safeguards during voting and counting, frequent instances of overcrowding, breaches in secrecy of the vote, and numerous instances of group voting”; and (C) asserted that “voting must be repeated” in certain polling stations. (21) The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe also noted that Serbian officials accused primarily peaceful protestors, opposition parties, and civil society of “attempting to destabilize the government”, a concerning allegation that threatens the safety of important elements of Serbian society. (22) Democratic countries whose values are in alignment with the United States make for stronger and more durable partnerships.

22 U.S.C. § 10702 Sense of Congress

It is a sense of Congress that the United States should— (1) encourage increased business links and investment between the United States and allies and partners; (2) support regional integration efforts in the Western Balkans; (3) strengthen and expand regional economic integration in the Western Balkans, with consideration for enterprises owned by and employing women and youth; (4) work with allies and partners committed to improving the rule of law, energy resource diversification, democratic and economic reform, and the reduction of poverty in the Western Balkans; (5) increase United States business links and investment with the Western Balkans, particularly in ways that support countries’ efforts—(A) to decrease dependence on Russian energy sources and fossil fuels; (B) to increase energy diversification, efficiency, and conservation; and (C) to facilitate the transition to cleaner and more reliable sources of energy, including renewables, as appropriate; (6) continue to assist in the development, within the Western Balkans, of—(A) strong civil societies; (B) public-private partnerships; (C) independent media; (D) transparent, accountable, citizen-responsive governance that ensure equal representation of all ethnic groups and respect for religious freedom; (E) political stability; and (F) modern, free-market based economies. (7) support the accession of those Western Balkans countries that are not already members to the European Union and to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (referred to in this section as “NATO”) for countries that—(A) desire membership; (B) are eligible for membership, (C) are supported by all allies to proceed with an invitation for such membership; and (D) are in a position to further the principles of the North Atlantic Treaty and meaningfully contribute to the collective security of NATO; (8) support—(A) maintaining the full European Union Force (EUFOR) mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina as being in the national security interests of the United States; and (B) encouraging NATO and the European Union to review their mission mandates and posture in Bosnia and Herzegovina to ensure they are playing a proactive role in establishing a safe and secure environment, particularly in the realm of defense; (9) acknowledge the European Union membership aspirations of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia and support those countries to meet the benchmarks required for their accession; (10) continue to support the cultural heritage, and recognize the languages, of the Western Balkans; (11) coordinate closely with the European Union, the United Kingdom, and other allies and partners on sanctions designations in Western Balkans countries and work to align efforts as much as possible to demonstrate a clear commitment to upholding democratic values; (12) expand bilateral security cooperation with non-NATO member Western Balkans countries, particularly efforts focused on regional integration and cooperation, including through the Adriatic Charter, which was launched at Tirana on May 2, 2003; (13) increase efforts to combat Russian malign influence campaigns and any other destabilizing or disruptive activities targeting the Western Balkans through engagement with government institutions, political stakeholders, journalists, civil society organizations, and industry leaders; (14) develop a series of cyber resilience standards, consistent with the Enhanced Cyber Defence Policy and Readiness Action Plan endorsed at the 2014 Wales Summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to expand cooperation with partners and allies, including in the Western Balkans, on cyber security, hybrid warfare, and ICT infrastructure; (15) articulate clearly and unambiguously the United States commitment to supporting democratic values and respect for international law as the sole path forward for the countries of the Western Balkans; (16) prioritize partnerships and programming with Western Balkan countries that demonstrate commitment toward strengthening their democracies and show respect for human rights; (17) encourage—(A) the development and expansion of the respective defense industrial bases of NATO Allies and security partners in the Western Balkan countries; and (B) increased national defense spending in accordance with the NATO Hague Summit Declaration agreed to by all NATO Allies in June 2025; (18) support the implementation of the Export Control and Related Border Security programs in the Western Balkans; and (19) work with allies and partners to strengthen law enforcement and investigative capacities in Western Balkan countries to disrupt transnational criminal organizations and corruption.

22 U.S.C. § 10703 Definitions

In this subtitle: (1) Appropriate committees of CongressThe term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—(A) the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate; (B) the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; (C) the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs of the Senate; (D) the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; (E) the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and (F) the Committee on Financial Services of the House of Representatives. (2) ICTThe term “ICT” means information and communication technology. (3) Western BalkansThe term “Western Balkans” means the region comprised of the following countries:(A) The Republic of Albania. (B) Bosnia and Herzegovina. (C) The Republic of Kosovo. (D) Montenegro. (E) The Republic of North Macedonia. (F) The Republic of Serbia. (4) Western Balkans countryThe term “Western Balkans country” means any country listed in subparagraphs (A) through (F) of paragraph (3).

22 U.S.C. § 10704 Sanctions relating to the Western Balkans

(a) In generalNot later than 90 days after December 18, 2025, the President shall impose the sanctions described in subsection (c) with respect to each foreign person that the President determines, on or after December 18, 2025, engages in an activity described in subsection (b). (b) Activities describedA foreign person engages in an activity described in this subsection if the foreign person has—(1) undertaken actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, stability, or territorial integrity of any area or state in the Western Balkans; (2) engaged or attempted to engage in actions or policies that undermine democratic processes or institutions in the Western Balkans; (3) engaged or attempted to engage in corruption related to the Western Balkans, including corruption by or on behalf of, a government in the Western Balkans, or a current or former government official in the Western Balkans; (4) engaged or attempting to engage in serious human rights abuses in the Western Balkans; or (5) engaged or attempted to engage in, acts that obstruct or threaten the implementation of any regional security, peace, cooperation, or mutual recognition agreement or framework or accountability mechanism related to the Western Balkans, including the Prespa Agreement of 2018; the Ohrid Framework Agreement of 2001; United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244; the Dayton Accords; or the Conclusions of the Peace Implementation Conference Council held in London in December 1995, including the decisions or conclusions of the High Representative, the Peace Implementation Council, or its Steering Board; or the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, or, with respect to the former Yugoslavia, the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals. (c) Sanctions describedThe sanctions described in this subsection are the following:(1) Blocking of propertyThe President may exercise all authorities granted under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to the extent necessary to block and prohibit all transactions in property and interests in property of the foreign person if such property and interests in property are in the United States, come within the United States, or come within the possession or control of a United States person. (2) Ineligibility for visas, admission, or parole(A) Visas, admission, or paroleAn alien described in subsection (a) shall be—(i) inadmissible to the United States; (ii) ineligible to receive a visa or other documentation to enter the United States; and (iii) otherwise ineligible to be admitted or paroled into the United States or to receive any other benefit under the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101 et 16 11 So in original. seq.). (B) Current visas revoked(i) In generalThe visa or other entry documentation of any alien described in subsection (a) is subject to revocation regardless of the issue date of the visa or other entry documentation. (ii) Immediate effectA revocation under clause (i) shall, in accordance with section 1201(i) of title 8—(I) take effect immediately; and (II) cancel any other valid visa or entry documentation that is in the possession of the alien. (d) Implementation; penalties(1) ImplementationThe President may exercise all authorities provided under sections 1702 and 1704 of title 50 for purposes of carrying out this section. (2) PenaltiesThe penalties provided for in subsections (b) and (c) of section 1705 of title 50 shall apply to a person that violates, attempts to violate, conspires to violate, or causes a violation of this section or any regulations promulgated to carry out this section to the same extent that such penalties apply to a person that commits an unlawful act described in section 1705(a) of title 50. (e) DefinitionsIn this section:(1) Agricultural commodityThe term “agricultural commodity” has the meaning given such term in section 5602 of title 7. (2) Medical deviceThe term “medical device” has the meaning given the term “device” in section 321 of title 21. (3) MedicineThe term “medicine” has the meaning given the term “drug” in section 321 of title 21. (4) Foreign personThe term “foreign person” means a person that is not a United States person. (f) Termination of sanctionsThe President may terminate the application of a sanction imposed pursuant to this section with respect to a person if the President certifies to the appropriate committees of Congress that—(1) the person is not engaging in the activity that was the basis for such sanction or has taken significant verifiable steps toward stopping such activity; and (2) the President has received reliable assurances that the person will not knowingly engage in activity subject to such sanction in the future. (g) Waiver(1) In generalThe President may waive the application of sanctions imposed pursuant to this section for renewable periods not to exceed 180 days if the President—(A) determines that such a waiver is in the national security interests of the United States; and (B) not less than 15 days before the granting of the waiver, submits to the appropriate committees of Congress a notice of and justification for the waiver. (2) FormThe waiver described in paragraph (1) may be transmitted in classified form. (h) Exceptions(1) Humanitarian assistanceSanctions authorized under this section shall not apply to—(A) the conduct or facilitation of a transaction for the provision of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, medical devices, humanitarian assistance, or for humanitarian purposes; or (B) transactions that are necessary for, or ordinarily incident to, the activities described in subparagraph (A). (2) Compliance with international obligations and law enforcement activitiesSanctions authorized under this section shall not apply with respect to an alien if admitting or paroling such alien is necessary—(A) to comply with United States obligations under—(i) the Agreement between the United Nations and the United States of America regarding the Headquarters of the United Nations, signed at Lake Success June 26, 1947, and entered into force November 21, 1947; (ii) the Convention on Consular Relations, done at Vienna April 24, 1963, and entered into force March 19, 1967; or (iii) any other international agreement; or (B) to carry out or assist law enforcement activity in the United States. (3) Exception for intelligence activitiesSanctions authorized under this section shall not apply to—(A) any activity subject to the reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3091 et seq.); or (B) any authorized intelligence activities of the United States. (4) Exception relating to importation of goods(A) In generalThe requirement to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property under this section shall not include the authority or a requirement to impose sanctions on the importation of goods. (B) Defined termIn this paragraph, the term “good” means any article, natural or manmade substance, material, supply or manufactured product, including inspection and test equipment, and excluding technical data. (i) RulemakingThe President is authorized to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this section (which may include regulatory exceptions), including under section1704 of title 50). (j) Rules of construction(1) Nothing in this section may be construed to limit the authorities of the President under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). (2) Nothing in this section shall be construed to modify any sanctions in effect as of December 18, 2025. (k) SunsetThis section shall cease to have force or effect beginning on the date that is 8 years after December 18, 2025.

22 U.S.C. § 10705 Democratic and economic development and prosperity initiatives

(a) Anti-corruption initiativeThe Secretary of State, through ongoing and new programs, should develop an initiative that—(1) seeks to expand technical assistance in each Western Balkans country, taking into account local conditions and contingent on the agreement of the host country government to develop new national anti-corruption strategies; (2) seeks to share best practices with, and provide training, including through the use of embedded advisors, to civilian law enforcement agencies and judicial institutions, and other relevant administrative bodies, of the Western Balkans countries, to improve the efficiency, transparency, and accountability of such agencies and institutions; (3) strengthens existing national anti-corruption strategies—(A) to combat political corruption, particularly in the judiciary, independent election oversight bodies, and public procurement processes; and (B) to strengthen regulatory and legislative oversight of critical governance areas, such as freedom of information and public procurement, including by strengthening cyber defenses and ICT infrastructure networks; (4) includes the Western Balkans countries in the European Democratic Resilience Initiative of the Department of State, or any equivalent successor initiative, and considers the Western Balkans as a recipient of anti-corruption funding for such initiative; and (5) seeks to promote the important role of an independent media in countering corruption through engagements with governments of Western Balkan countries and providing training opportunities for journalists on investigative reporting. (b) Prioritizing cyber resilience, regional economic connectivity, and economic competitiveness(1) Sense of CongressIt is the sense of Congress that—(A) promoting stronger economic, civic, and political relationships among Western Balkans countries will enable countries to better utilize existing resources and maximize their economic security and democratic resilience by reinforcing cyber defenses and increasing economic activity among other countries in the region; and (B) United States private investments in and assistance toward creating a more integrated region ensures political stability and security for the region. (2) 5-year strategy for economic development and democratic resilience in Western BalkansNot later than 180 days after December 18, 2025, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a regional economic development and democratic resilience strategy for the Western Balkans that—(A) takes into account the efforts of the European Union, European nations, and other multilateral financing institutions; (B) considers the full set of tools and resources available from the relevant agencies; (C) includes efforts to ensure coordination with multilateral and bilateral partners, such as the European Union, the World Bank, and other relevant assistance frameworks; (D) includes an initial assessment of—(i) economic opportunities for which United States businesses, or those of other like-minded partner countries, would be competitive; (ii) legal, economic, governance, infrastructural, or other barriers limiting United States economic activity and investment in the Western Balkans; (iii) the effectiveness of all existing regional cooperation initiatives, such as the Open Balkan initiative and the Western Balkans Common Regional Market; and (iv) ways to increase United States economic activity and investment within the Western Balkans; (E) considers ways to develop human and institutional capacity and infrastructure across multiple sectors of economies, including clean energy, energy efficiency, agriculture, small and medium-sized enterprise development, health, and cyber-security; (F) considers ways to assist with the development and implementation of programs or initiatives to increase economic development and prosperity in the region; (G) considers ways to support small- and medium-sized businesses, including youth-owned and women-owned enterprises; (H) considers ways to promote government and civil society policies and programs that combat corruption and encourage transparency (including by supporting independent media by promoting the safety and security of journalists), free and fair competition, sound governance, judicial reform, environmental stewardship, and business environments conducive to sustainable and inclusive economic growth; and (I) includes a public diplomacy strategy that describes the actions that will be taken by relevant agencies to increase support for the United States relationship by citizens of Western Balkans countries. (3) BriefingNot later than 90 days after December 18, 2025, the Secretary of State shall provide a briefing to the appropriate committees of Congress that describes the progress made towards developing the strategy required under paragraph (2). (c) Regional economic connectivity and development initiative(1) AuthorizationThe Secretary of State, in coordination with the heads of other relevant Federal departments and agencies, may coordinate a regional economic connectivity and development initiative for the region comprised of each Western Balkans country and any European Union member country that shares a border with a Western Balkans country (referred to in this subsection as the “Western Balkans region”) in accordance with this subsection. (2) Initiative elementsThe initiative authorized under paragraph (1) shall—(A) promote private sector growth and competitiveness and increase the capacity of businesses, particularly small and medium-sized enterprises, in the Western Balkans region; (B) aim to increase intraregional exports to countries in the Balkans and European Union member states; (C) aim to increase United States economic activity and investments in countries in the Western Balkans; (D) support startup companies, including companies led by youth or women, in the Western Balkans region by—(i) providing training in business skills and leadership; and (ii) providing opportunities to connect to sources of capital; (E) encourage and promote increased economic activity and investment in the Western Balkans through engagement with the Western Balkans diaspora communities in the United States and abroad; (F) provide assistance to the governments and civil society organizations of Western Balkans countries to develop—(i) regulations to ensure fair and effective investment; and (ii) screening tools to identify and deter malign foreign investments and other coercive economic practices; (G) identify areas where application of additional resources and workforce retraining could expand successful programs to 1 or more countries in the Western Balkans region by building on the existing experience and program architecture; (H) compare existing single-country sector analyses to determine areas of focus that would benefit from a regional approach with respect to the Western Balkans region; and (I) promote intraregional economic connectivity throughout the Western Balkans region through—(i) programming, including grants, cooperative agreements, and other forms of assistance; (ii) expanding awareness of the availability of loans and other financial instruments from the United States Government; and (iii) coordinating access to existing instruments to promote economic activity and investment that are available through allies and partners in the Western Balkans region, including the European Union and international financial institutions. (3) Support for regional infrastructure projectsThe initiative authorized under paragraph (1) should facilitate and prioritize support for regional infrastructure projects, including—(A) transportation projects that build roads, bridges, railways and other physical infrastructure to facilitate travel of goods and people throughout the Western Balkans region; (B) technical support and the promotion of investments needed to meet United States and European Union standards for air travel, including screening and information sharing; (C) the development of telecommunications networks with trusted providers; (D) infrastructure projects that connect Western Balkans countries to each other and to countries with which they share a border; (E) information exchange on effective tender procedures and transparent procurement processes; (F) investment transparency programs that will help countries in the Western Balkans analyze gaps and establish institutional and regulatory reforms necessary—(i) to create an enabling environment for economic activities and investment; and (ii) to strengthen protections against high-risk investments; (G) sharing best practices learned from the United States and other international partners to ensure that institutional and regulatory mechanisms are fair, nonarbitrary, effective, and free from corruption; (H) projects that support regional energy security and reduce dependence on Russian energy; (I) technical assistance and generating private investment in projects that promote connectivity and energy-sharing in the Western Balkans region; (J) technical assistance to support regional collaboration on environmental protection that includes governmental, political, civic, and business stakeholders; and (K) technical assistance to develop financing options and help create linkages with potential financing institutions and investors. (4) RequirementsAll programming under the initiative authorized under paragraph (1) should—(A) be open to the participation of Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia; (B) be consistent with European Union accession requirements; (C) be focused on retaining talent within the Western Balkans; (D) promote government policies in Western Balkans countries that encourage free and fair competition, sound governance, environmental protection, and business environments that are conducive to sustainable and inclusive economic growth; and (E) include a public diplomacy strategy to inform local and regional audiences in the Western Balkans region about the initiative, including specific programs and projects. (d) United States International Development Finance Corporation(1) AppointmentsNot later than 1 year after December 18, 2025, subject to the availability of appropriations, the Chief Executive Officer of the United States International Development Finance Corporation, in collaboration with the Secretary of State, should consider including a regional office with responsibilities for the Western Balkans within the Corporation’s plans to open new regional offices. (2) Joint reportNot later than 180 days after December 18, 2025, the Chief Executive Officer of the United States International Development Finance Corporation and the Secretary of State should submit a joint report to the appropriate committees of Congress that includes—(A) an assessment of the benefits of providing sovereign loan guarantees to countries in the Western Balkans to support infrastructure and energy diversification projects; (B) an outline of additional resources, such as tools, funding, and personnel, which may be required to offer sovereign loan guarantees in the Western Balkans; and (C) an assessment of how the United States International Development Finance Corporation, in coordination with the United States Trade and Development Agency and the Export-Import Bank of the United States, can deploy its insurance products in support of bonds or other instruments issued to raise capital through United States financial markets in the Western Balkans.

22 U.S.C. § 10706 Promoting cross-cultural and educational engagement

(a) Sense of CongressIt is the sense of Congress that—(1) promoting partnerships between United States universities and universities in the Western Balkans advances United States foreign policy goals and requires a whole-of-government approach, including the utilization of public-private partnerships; and (2) such partnerships would provide opportunities for exchanging academic ideas, technical expertise, research, and cultural understanding for the benefit of the United States and may provide additional beneficial opportunities for cooperation in the private sector. (b) University partnershipsThe President, working through the Secretary of State, is authorized to promote partnerships between United States universities and universities in the Western Balkans, including—(1) supporting research and analysis on cyber resilience; (2) working with partner governments to reform policies, improve curricula, strengthen data systems, train teachers and students, including English language teaching, and to provide quality, inclusive learning materials; (3) encouraging knowledge exchanges to help provide individuals, especially those who historically have had reduced access to relevant education, training, and skills for meaningful employment; (4) promoting teaching and research exchanges between institutions of higher education in the Western Balkans and in the United States; and (5) encouraging alliances and exchanges with like-minded institutions of education within the Western Balkans and the larger European continent.

22 U.S.C. § 10707 Young Balkan Leaders Initiative

(a) Sense of CongressIt is the sense of Congress that—(1) regular people-to-people exchange programs that bring religious leaders, journalists, civil society members, politicians, and other individuals from the Western Balkans to the United States will strengthen existing relationships and advance United States interests and shared values in the Western Balkans region; and (2) the Department of State, through BOLD, a leadership program for young leaders in certain Western Balkans countries, plays an important role to develop young leaders in improving civic engagement and economic development in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and Montenegro. (b) AuthorizationThe Secretary of State should continue the BOLD Leadership Program, which shall hereafter be known as the “Young Balkan Leaders Initiative”, to promote educational and professional development for young adult leaders and professionals in the Western Balkans who have demonstrated a passion to contribute to the continued development of the Western Balkans region. (c) Conduct of initiativeThe goals of the Young Balkan Leaders Initiative should include—(1) building the capacity of young Balkan leaders in the Western Balkans in the areas of business and information technology, cyber security and digitization, agriculture, civic engagement, and public administration; (2) supporting young Balkan leaders by offering professional development, training, and networking opportunities, particularly in the areas of leadership, innovation, civic engagement, elections, human rights, entrepreneurship, good governance, public administration, and journalism; (3) supporting young political, parliamentary, and civic Balkan leaders in collaboration on regional initiatives related to good governance, environmental protection, government ethics, and minority inclusion; and (4) providing increased economic and technical assistance to young Balkan leaders to promote economic growth and strengthen ties between businesses, investors, and entrepreneurs in the United States and in Western Balkans countries. (d) FellowshipsUnder the Young Balkan Leaders Initiative, the Secretary of State is authorized to award fellowships to young leaders from the Western Balkans who—(1) are between 18 and 35 years of age; (2) have demonstrated strong capabilities in entrepreneurship, innovation, public service, and leadership; (3) have had a positive impact in their communities, organizations, or institutions, including by promoting cross-regional and multiethnic cooperation; and (4) represent a cross-section of the country’s demographics. (e) Briefing on certain exchange programsNot later than 180 days after December 18, 2025, the Secretary of State shall provide a briefing to the appropriate committees of Congress that describes the status of exchange programs involving the Western Balkans region.

22 U.S.C. § 10708 Supporting cybersecurity and cyber resilience in the Western Balkans

(a) Sense of CongressIt is the sense of Congress that—(1) United States support for cybersecurity, cyber resilience, and secure ICT infrastructure in Western Balkans countries will strengthen the region’s ability to defend itself from and respond to malicious cyber activity conducted by nonstate and foreign actors, including foreign governments, that seek to influence the region; (2) insecure ICT networks that are vulnerable to manipulation can increase opportunities for—(A) the compromise of cyber infrastructure, including data networks, electronic infrastructure, and software systems; and (B) the use of online information operations by adversaries and malign actors to undermine United States allies and interests; (3) it is in the national security interest of the United States to support the cybersecurity and cyber resilience of Western Balkans countries; and (4) it is in the national security interest of the United States to support continued progress to enhance cybersecurity infrastructure in Western Balkan countries in response to threats posed by state and non-state actors, including threats originating from the Russian Federation, the People’s Republic of China, the Islamic Republic of Iran, or the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. (b) Interagency report on cybersecurity and the digital information environment in Western Balkans countriesNot later than 1 year after December 18, 2025, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the heads of other relevant Federal agencies, shall submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress and the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate that contains—(1) an overview of interagency efforts to strengthen cybersecurity and cyber resilience in Western Balkans countries; (2) a review of the information environment in each Western Balkans country; (3) a review of existing United States Government cyber and digital initiatives that—(A) counter influence operations and safeguard elections and democratic processes in Western Balkans countries; (B) strengthen ICT infrastructure, digital accessibility, and cybersecurity capacity in the Western Balkans; (C) support democracy and internet freedom in Western Balkans countries; and (D) build cyber capacity of governments who are allies or partners of the United States; (4) an assessment of cyber threat information sharing between the United States and Western Balkans countries; (5) an assessment of—(A) options for the United States to better support cybersecurity and cyber resilience in Western Balkans countries through changes to current assistance authorities; and (B) the advantages or limitations, such as funding or office space, of posting cyber professionals from other Federal departments and agencies to United States diplomatic posts in Western Balkans countries and providing relevant training to Foreign Service Officers; and (6) any additional support needed from the United States for the cybersecurity and cyber resilience of the following NATO Allies: Albania, Montenegro, and North Macedonia.

22 U.S.C. § 10709 Relations between Kosovo and Serbia

(a) Sense of CongressIt is the sense of Congress that—(1) the Agreement on the Path to Normalization of Relations, which was agreed to by Kosovo and Serbia on February 27, 2023, with the facilitation of the European Union, is a positive step forward in advancing normalization between the two countries; (2) Serbia and Kosovo should seek to make immediate progress on the Implementation Annex to the agreement referred to in paragraph (1); (3) once sufficient progress has been made on the Implementation Annex, the United States should consider advancing initiatives to strengthen bilateral relations with both countries, which could include—(A) establishing bilateral strategic dialogues with Kosovo and Serbia; and (B) advancing concrete initiatives to deepen economic ties and investment with both countries; and (4) the United States should continue to support a comprehensive final agreement between Kosovo and Serbia based on mutual recognition. (b) Statement of policyIt is the policy of the United States Government that—(1) it shall not pursue any policy that advocates for land swaps, partition, or other forms of redrawing borders along ethnic lines in the Western Balkans as a means to settle disputes between nation states in the region; and (2) it should support pluralistic democracies in countries in the Western Balkans as a means to prevent a return to the ethnic strife that once characterized the region.

22 U.S.C. § 10710 Reports on Russian and Chinese malign influence operations and campaigns in the Western Balkans

(a) Reports requiredNot later than 180 days after December 18, 2025, and every two years thereafter, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence, and the heads of other Federal departments or agencies, as appropriate, shall submit a report to the appropriate committees of Congress, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives regarding Russian and Chinese malign influence operations and campaigns carried out with respect to Balkan countries that seek—(1) to undermine democratic institutions; (2) to promote political instability; and (3) to harm the interests of the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization member and partner states in the Western Balkans. (b) ElementsEach report submitted pursuant to subsection (a) shall include—(1) an assessment of the objectives of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China regarding malign influence operations and campaigns carried out with respect to Western Balkans countries—(A) to undermine democratic institutions, including the planning and execution of democratic elections; (B) to promote political instability; and (C) to manipulate the information environment; (2) the activities and roles of the Department of State and other relevant Federal agencies in countering Russian and Chinese malign influence operations and campaigns; (3) an assessment of—(A) each network, entity and individual, to the extent such information is available, of Russia, China, or any other country with which Russia or China may cooperate, that is supporting such Russian or Chinese malign influence operations or campaigns, including the provision of financial or operational support to activities in a Western Balkans country that may limit freedom of speech or create barriers of access to democratic processes, including exercising the right to vote in a free and fair election; and (B) the role of each such entity in providing such support;(4) the identification of the tactics, techniques, and procedures used in Russian or Chinese malign influence operations and campaigns in Western Balkans countries; (5) an assessment of the effect of previous Russian or Chinese malign influence operations and campaigns that targeted alliances and partnerships of the United States Armed Forces in the Western Balkans, including the effectiveness of such operations and campaigns in achieving the objectives of Russia and China, respectively; (6) the identification of each Western Balkans country with respect to which Russia or China has conducted or attempted to conduct a malign influence operation or campaign; (7) an assessment of the capacity and efforts of NATO and of each individual Western Balkans country to counter Russian or Chinese malign influence operations and campaigns carried out with respect to Western Balkans countries; (8) the efforts by the United States to combat such malign influence operations in the Western Balkans, including through the Countering Russian Influence Fund and the Countering People’s Republic of China Malign Influence Fund; (9) an assessment of the tactics, techniques, and procedures that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, determines are likely to be used in future Russian or Chinese malign influence operations and campaigns carried out with respect to Western Balkans countries; and (10) activities that the Department of State and other relevant Federal agencies could use to increase the United States Government’s capacity to counter Russian and Chinese malign influence operations and campaigns in Western Balkans countries. (c) FormEach report required under subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

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